
**EMERGING POWERS AND RE-IMAGINING GLOBAL ORDER:
RISING RIVALRY BETWEEN UNITED STATES, CHINA AND INDIA
IN INDO-PACIFIC**

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ABSTRACT

In the changing scenario of world politics, a power transition is underway in 'global order'. Though, the predominant power— 'United States' is trying hard to maintain its supremacy but the centre of gravity of power is shifting towards 'Indo-Pacific' in which two major powers— 'China and India' are emerging. This paper discusses how the emergence of new powers will re-imagine or re-build the present global order and how the rivalry between dominant power and emerging powers would take place in the new geo-strategic and geo-economic framework of Indo-Pacific. In the context of 're-imagining global order', this paper examines the transformation of 'North-South divide' into 'North-South linkage' due to the rise of 'Global South' countries— particularly China and India, as a new centre of economic power. It also examines the impact of forces of growth and globalization on new global order and tries to analyse the role of transnational threats like climate change and terrorism on the sharing concerns of 'global commons' that will lead to build a new global order. In particular, this paper focuses on global power shift, emergence of strategically and economically pivot region of Indo-Pacific, ascending of global south, rising rivalry between predominant power and emerging powers, and re-imagining of global order.

Key words: Global order, Indo-Pacific, United States, Global south, China, India.

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INTRODUCTION

The twenty first century is already witnessing the ‘Rise of South’— particularly ‘China and India’ to global prominence. The sustained growth and fast economic development of these two emerging powers have blown the siren to the ears of developed North countries and also to the predominant power of the present day. The increased global profile of China and India and their power projection jump in international system have established both as a great power and key player of new unfolding game of ‘global power shift’. There is a general expectation that these two countries of South would be among those that shape the geopolitics of the rest of the century and would play a pivotal role in the ‘re-imagining of global order’.

The global shift in the centre of gravity of power from ‘Trans-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific’ has also given rise to the debate of re-imagining of global order. Now ‘Indo-Pacific’ is the new emerging geostrategic and geo-economic centre of the world politics that encompasses both the Indian and Pacific oceans, defined in large part by the geographically expanding interests and reach of ‘emerging powers’— China and India, and the continued strategic role and presence of the ‘predominant power’— United States (US). Therefore, there are significant regional security convergences and different degrees of strategic balancing between these major players in Indo-Pacific region, which will definitely rise rivalry between US, China and India to build a new global order. Actually, ‘the Indo-Pacific region is a critical part of the global commons—with the United States, India and China all active there’ (Beazley 2012:50). Thus, it is the most strategically contested area in the world, where both cooperation and competition simultaneously occur. The biggest security challenge in Indo-Pacific region is the grand accommodation between one dominant power— United States and two rapidly emerging powers— China and India. Thus it is a tough task to build a global order of great significance.

In addition, the ‘North-South artificial divide’ is also an obstacle in making of a unified global order. With the continuous ‘growth’ and impact of ‘technology driven globalization’, the North-South relations are looking more stable now than previous era. ‘Human Development Report-2013’ also states that the precariously rooted inequalities of power, massive gaps in quality of life are now wiping out from South countries. Therefore, South is rising and there is no alternative for North to accept the rise of South and ‘shake hand-march together’. Also, the globally spreading ‘terrorism’ is a threat in front of world that needs a ‘collective war against terrorism’ to abolish its roots. ‘Climate change’ is another threat

which can not be resolved without global concern. No one can escape from the effect of it and no one can alone fight with this. Therefore, this is the great responsibility for world to stand collectively against these threats in a stable global order.

Hence the pressing task for present dominant power— United States and emerging powers— China and India is to ‘build and sustain substantial and purposeful dialogues to find viable mechanisms for communicating their interests and concerns to each other, managing the impending rivalry and generating synergy for ... stability and prosperity’ (Zhao 2013) to re-imagine a new global order.

RISE OF GLOBAL SOUTH: CHINA AND INDIA AS EMERGING POWERS

Over the past two decades, a fundamental transformation has taken place in the global scenario, driven by the impressive economic growth of developing countries of South like— ‘China, India, Brazil, and South Africa’. This transformation has glazed the globe with the acceptance of the notion of ‘Rising South’. Human Development Report 2013- ‘The Rise of the Global South’ also advocates this. Now the economic and political centre of gravity is inexorably moving towards the rising South. And not surprisingly, ‘China and India’ are two well recognized emerging powers of South with the major share of the global GDP (Gross Domestic Production) and fastest growing economic and strategic weight.

China and India are now major players in global economic decisions as part of the both ‘G-20’¹ and the ‘G-8 + 5’² (G-8 plus the 5 leading emerging economies). According to ‘IMF’ (International Monetary Fund) data, Over the past decade China’s economy has expanded at an average annual rate of 8.4 percent, while India’s economy has grown at an annual average rate of 6.0 percent. And, over the same period ‘OECD’ (Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development) economies that include world’s 34 major economies like US and Canada have grown by an annual average of only 2.7 percent. Acknowledging this global economic shift, American Economist ‘Nouriel Roubini’ stated that ‘Increasingly China [and] India are [now] going to be sources of global economic growth’(The Economic Times 2013). ‘World Bank Report 2013’, also states that today China is the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP, while India ranks 10th after overtaking Canada.

¹ G-20 is a group of finance ministers and central bank governors from 20 major economies: 19 countries (Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, Indonesia, India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, United Kingdom and United States) plus the European Union. Collectively, the G-

20 economies account for approximately 86% of the gross world product (GWP), 80 percent of world trade (including EU intra-trade), and two-thirds of the world population.

² G8+5 (The Group of Eight + Five) is an international group that consists of the leaders of the heads of government from the G8 nations (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States), plus the heads of government of the five leading emerging economies (Brazil, China, India, Mexico, and South Africa).

‘Price Waterhouse Coopers report- The World in 2050’ predicted that by the year 2050, China would overtake U.S and become world’s largest economy while India would be on number third after United States. So these massive economic changes clearly indicate that the economic dominance of ‘Global North’ will no longer remain intact in coming years. China and India would overtake major global economic share. And, this is no secret that ‘the rise of economic power also implies the rise of political and strategical power’.

Now, both China and India are modernising their power-projection capabilities. China is doing so much more rapidly, its military budget is the world’s second-largest after United States. Meanwhile, India has also replaced China as the world’s largest arms importer. Though, nowadays technology and type of weapons will surely help a side win a war, but having the numbers will also do a lot for confidence and territory combats. After all, there is strength in numbers. And in the term of numbers, China has largest army in the world while US has second largest and India possess third largest army. But in terms of military power, China has second most powerful army after US, while Indian army is fourth most powerful. Territory, Naval and Air Force defence capabilities of each country is remarkable. Today, China and India are competent nuclear powers and each has a sizable nuclear arsenal. According to the ‘Federation of American Scientists’, China has about 240 warheads while India has nearly 100. Also, in the field of ‘Space Technology’, whether China has recently developed an ‘Anti-satellite missile’ to rupture the dominance of US in the satellite warheads, India has also put a heavy mark in space by successful launch of its Mars mission- ‘Mangalyaan’ on 5th November, 2013. The success of this space mission will definitely push India ahead of other space rivals China and Japan in the field of interplanetary exploration, because India is the fourth country after United States, Europe, and Russia those sent probes that have orbited or landed on Mars. Hence, China and India are now the two fastest emerging powers of the world which are reflecting the ‘Rising South’.

EMERGENCE OF INDO-PACIFIC: A NEW CENTRE OF GRAVITY OF POWER

Indo-Pacific³ is the new emerging Asian maritime strategic system which stretches from the Indian Ocean to Western Pacific. The rapid expansion of trade, investments, because, Indo-Pacific is a region which contains close to half the world's population and draws Australia together with the emerging powers of China and India, the dynamic sub-regions of Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia, and the resource rich and sometimes volatile Middle East and Africa with the continuous strategic and military presence of United States. Moreover the region provides several of the world's most important choke-points for global commerce including the 'Strait of Malacca', through which almost a quarter of world trade passes.

³ Indo-Pacific terminology has a long-standing acceptance as a distinct biogeographic region in Marine Science. But in geopolitics, the term was occasionally used in the early and mid-20th century. Notably, it has reemerged in a gathering tempo of expert commentaries and official statements in recent years. Indo-Pacific term was first used by G. S. Khurana in 2007 in an article titled 'Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation' in Strategic Analysis Journal. The spirit of the term was picked up by Japan's Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, in his speech to the Indian Parliament in August 2007 in the context of 'broader Asia'. The Former US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton, first officially used the term 'Indo-Pacific' in October 2010, in Honolulu, in a geopolitical sense, to elucidate developments in the Asia Pacific region. Since 2011, the term 'Indo-Pacific' is being used increasingly in the global strategic and geo-political discourses. However, an official documented articulation of the term first appeared in 'Australia's Defence White Paper, 2013'.

Therefore, Indo-Pacific Region is now growing as a geo-economic as well as a geo-strategic centre of world politics where a shift in global balance of power is occurring. Analysing the emergence of the Indo-Pacific region, Tellis (2012) argued that,

The Indian Ocean is going to be increasingly integrated with the Western Pacific. In fact, the concept of 'Indo-Pacific' is not as fantastical as one would have thought a decade or two decades ago, because . . . economics and politics will combine to push a much tighter integration of these two ocean spaces than before.

Hence as a geopolitical concept, 'Indo-Pacific' (referring to the Indian and Pacific Oceans) certainly seems more expansive [among scholars] than the term 'Asia-Pacific'. Presumably, it is more rational in so far as it adequately reflects changing American priorities in the region' (Gupta 2011). Indo-Pacific also 'represents the inclusion of the western Pacific within the range of India's security interests. . . . It is also a reflection of the concept of the Asia-Pacific, which hitherto excluded India, expanding westwards to encompass the subcontinent as its integral part' (Saran 2011). Thus, Indo-Pacific is the new 'battlefield of powers' where emerging powers— China and India are contesting with predominant power— United

States. Seeing the emerging importance of Indo-Pacific as a new ‘centre of gravity of power’, Former US Ambassador, Freeman (2012) stated that,

Since the end of the Cold War, the Indo-Pacific region has emerged as the world’s most dynamic geopolitical zone. Shifting balances of power— there are reshaping international perceptions . . . the Indo-Pacific region is the world’s new economic center of gravity and that balance of power within it is evolving . . . The Indo-Pacific region is now the fulcrum of global geopolitics.

GREAT POWER RIVALRY: US, CHINA AND INDIA IN INDO-PACIFIC

Emergence of new powers— China and India, and shift in centre of gravity of power towards Indo-Pacific have changed the great global power game which was jockeying alone by predominant power— United States since early of twentieth century. Now, it seems that the dominance of US is declining. And, there may be two possible reasons— first is, ‘shift of power’ from Trans-Atlantic region to Indo-Pacific, that has been discussed and second is ‘diffusion of power’ from US to new emerging centres of power. Diffusion of power simply means ‘outflow of power’ or ‘power distribution’. When new centres of power emerge, the power outflows from power block towards new ones. And, this is not an exception for predominant power- United States. Daalder (2013), the US Ambassador to the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) and the President of Chicago Council on Global Affairs argued that ‘power isn't shifting from the US to others; it is diffusing among us all’. US is, therefore, trying hard to retain its supremacy and to remain indeed, intensify and influential in global engagements. Hence the globe is now moving fast towards a great power rivalry between US and new emerging powers— particularly, China and India in Indo-Pacific.

The strategic rivalry among powers in the Indo-Pacific region first came in focus when United States took the decisions to place littoral combat ships at Singapore in 2011, from where they could be deployed Northwest up to the ‘Strait of Malacca’ into the Eastern Indian Ocean or Northeast up to the ‘South China Sea’ into the Western Pacific to undertone ‘China-centric balancing’ in the region. US deployment of ‘Unmanned Aerial Vehicle’ (UAV) units on the Australian-Indian Ocean Island of ‘Cocos’ is also being mooted specifically for military and intelligence surveillance in Indo-Pacific. Obama’s trip to Australia in November 2011, also brought his talk of ‘new opportunities to train with other allies and partners, from the Pacific to the Indian Ocean,’ (Obama 2011) in other words, across the Indo-Pacific, which is developing as a ‘region of great power contest’. Actually, the practical reflection of

such talk was agreement to ‘strengthen the US presence at Darwin on Australia’s Northwestern coast- [and it’s surely] a power projection jump to Indo-Pacific nexus which points onto the western Pacific (including the South China Sea) and the eastern Indian Ocean (including the Strait of Malacca)’ (Luke 2012). The announcement of US base on Darwin was judged as part of a ‘rebalancing of power in the Indo-Pacific region . . . in a move that could alter the security contours of the Indo-Pacific’ (Bakrie 2012).

It is, therefore, true that a power game of great significance has unfolded in emerging strategic region of Indo-Pacific. And, the broader ‘Indo-Pacific’ region, particularly in context of this power game has become narrower to the strategic framework of ‘East Indian Ocean–South China Sea–Western Pacific Ocean’ continuum. The reason is own and competitive strategic interests of US, China and India in the region. However, United States, India, Japan, Australia and other players are seeking to collaborate to build a new order in the region that is congenial to their long-term interests. But, China is not necessarily excluded from this project, and it also seeks a seat at the table to recast the strategic objectives and interaction norms that bind all participating states. China is increasingly wary of its rising military power and intentions; and is also seeking closer strategic relations with the United States, India and other players to boost its dominance in the region. Also from India’s security perspective, China’s ‘String of Pearls’⁴ policy can’t be ignored. Chinese military naval base in Pakistan’s Gwadar, Hambantota container port in Sri Lanka, Marao naval base in Maldives, commercial naval base in Myanmar and port facilities at Chittagong in Bangladesh clearly indicate China’s intention to cast a strategic net around India in Indo-Pacific.

India is also aware of its growing interests and multiplying challenges in the Indo-Pacific region, and the necessity for cooperation with regional players like United States, Japan, Australia and ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) to tackle these challenges. ‘India’s foreign policy approach traditionally has been one of engaging other countries on mutually agreeable terms, not at the instruction or behest of another country - United States or China, because ‘maintaining its ‘strategic autonomy’⁵ is an integral part of India’s foreign policy process’ (Gnanagurunathan 2012).

⁴ String of Pearls refers to the network of Chinese military and commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication, which extend from the Chinese mainland to Port Sudan. The sea lines run through several major maritime choke points such as the Strait of Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz and the Lombok Strait, as well as other strategic maritime centers in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, the Maldives and Somalia. The term as a geopolitical concept was first used in an internal United States Department

of Defense report titled 'Energy Futures in Asia'. The term has never been used by official Chinese government sources, although it's often used in the Indian media.

⁵ Strategic Autonomy denotes the changing course of India's current foreign policy trajectory. The new phase of Non Aligned movement (NAM) has now translated into a modern-day phrase - Strategic Autonomy. This term was first time officially documented in a policy paper of CPR (Centre for Policy Research) entitled 'Non Alignment 2.0: A foreign and strategic policy for India in the 21st century', which identifies the basic principles and drivers that would make the country a leading player on the world stage while preserving its strategic autonomy and value system. The findings and views of this document are product of collective deliberation by an independent group of analysts and policy makers: Sunil Khilnani, Rajiv Kumar, Pratap Bhanu Mehta, Lt. Gen. (Retd.) Prakash Menon, Nandan Nilekani, Srinath Raghavan, Shyam Saran, Siddharth Varadarajan.

Yet, another crucial issue related to India's security dimension is to recognise the difference between India's intentions and its capabilities. Certainly the Indian navy possesses the ability to protect its commercial and strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. But its capacity to engage in either the South China Sea or the Pacific is currently limited, although its navy modernisation process is underway and now India also has a developing 'Blue-water Navy' (a maritime force capable of operating across the deep waters of open oceans) like US and China. Therefore, in strategic nexus, 'the sea lanes of Indo-Pacific are becoming more crowded, contested and vulnerable to armed strife. Naval and air forces are being strengthened amid shifting balances of economic and strategic weight' (Medcalf et al. 2011:3). Also, 'the rapid expansion of Indian and Chinese naval capabilities and the United States' own search for maritime partners have lent a special significance to the expanding cooperation between New Delhi and Washington in the Indian and Pacific Oceans' (Mohan 2010:142).

Therefore, all these unfolding complex games have now developed the 'Indo-Pacific' region as an emerging centre of 'struggle of powers', where China fears Indian rise and US containment, India fears Chinese containment and the US fears Chinese dominance; there is the potential for many friction areas to develop into potential areas of conflict. Hence, the potential for clash in the Indo-Pacific in the next decade and beyond is very high and each player must do more to mitigate the risk and to build new and stable global order.

RE-IMAGINING GLOBAL ORDER: SHIFTING POWERS AND CONVERGING INTERESTS

Today, world is on the verge of a great global transformation that is shaping global biosphere and is, therefore, central to whether the world succeeds in re-imagining of a new global order or not. At present, the global power is shifting from the 'North' to the 'Rising South' countries (particularly China and India), and also the centre of power is moving towards

Indo-Pacific. But ‘in the world of complex interdependence, who wields power, to what end and with what consequences is far from clear’ (Nye 2013). Also, it’s tough to predict changing nature of international relations in the diverse global scenario, where ‘National interests are driven by negotiations, powers are earned by businesses and conflicts are resolved by complex cooperations’ (Gaurav 2013:59). Hence, the new ‘Global Order’ would not just be a result of power transition; it would also be a reflection of shifting powers toward Indo-Pacific and converging interests of dominant and emerging powers toward global concerns.

Robert Gilpin (1981) and Paul Kennedy (1987) have described that power transitions are a recurring problem in international relations. World politics has been marked by a succession of powerful states rising up to organize the international system. A powerful state can create and enforce the rules and institutions of a stable global order to pursue its interests and security. But nothing lasts forever; long-term changes in the shift of power give rise to new challenger states, which set off a struggle over the terms of that global order. Rising states want to translate their newly acquired power into greater authority in the global system to reshape the rules and institutions in accordance with their own interests, while declining states fear their loss of control and worry about the security implications of their weakened position.

Today, the rise of China and India and the relative decline of United States have pushed the power transition wave in global order. Ashley J. Tellis and Sean Mirski argued that, ... if the history of previous rising powers is any indication, as China and India continue to grow they will want to progressively reshape the international system to advance their own interests—interests that may differ from those of the United States, the established hegemon that sustains the current global order. (Tellis and Mirski 2013:5)

Though US is trying to sustain the present global order but these two emerging power are enforcing to reshape the rules and institutions of international system. Often, this type of power transitions is driven by war to find ways of gaining status, authority and opportunities to play a role in governing the order. But at the present time United States, China, and India all are nuclear powers. Hence, in the age of nuclear deterrence, great-power war is, thankfully, no longer a mechanism of change in global order.

Nevertheless, shift in centre of gravity of power towards Indo-Pacific is another ground which is narrowing the contesting interests of powers to build a new order. Thus, Indo-Pacific is now emerging as a ‘centre of geo-economic and geo-strategic contest’, where both

dominant power—US and emerging powers— China and India are contesting to find viable mechanism of pursuing their interests and ordering the region towards their own security nexus. Therefore, there is an imperative need to understand how these two emerging powers envision of various issues relating to the global order and what efforts are made by present dominant power— United States to make the global order more open and more liberal to tackle the waves of power transition and power shift. Such an understanding would disclose the level of their comfort with the existing international system while simultaneously providing indications about how they might seek to re-imagine the global order. If China and India attain the ability to do so in the coming decades and agree on the changes to be made, especially when it comes to their relationship with United States, will surely influence and decide the global order's future character.

A prosperous and unified global order might be possible when the 'interests of both dominant and emerging powers will be converged' and the 'artificial divide of two order system— North and South will be removed'. Forces of growth and globalization have now wiped out the inequalities of power and prosperity, and massive gap in quality of life and in cultural values between North and South countries. Hence, the monolithic blocks of North and South are now outdated. 'Rise of Global South' is now a reality which has busted the dominance of 'G-7'⁶ countries by integrating with them in a new platform of 'G-20' to negotiate for their own place on the table.

Also, the global concerns over the transnational threats like climate change and terrorism demand a collective approach of North-South countries to deal with them. In lack of collective endeavours the past years have been particularly disappointing in terms of viable agreement on the issue of climate change. The 'U.N. climate conference' in 'Copenhagen' revealed the shortcomings of large gatherings as settings for complex negotiations and failed to yield a legally binding successor to the 'Kyoto Protocol'. Agreement on establishing

⁶ G-7 is a group consisting of the finance ministers of seven developed nations: the US, U.K., France, Germany, Italy, Canada and Japan. They are the seven wealthiest developed nations on Earth by global net wealth.

'Green Climate Fund', and a 'Climate Technology Centre and Network' was come as an outcome of next conference held at 'Cancun' in 2010. The successive 'Durban' and 'Doha' conferences were also not succeeded in binding all countries on a agreement but made 'agree to a legally binding deal comprising all countries, which will be prepared by 2015, and to take effect in 2020'. The recently held 'Warsaw Conference-2013' led all countries to an agreement that 'all states would start cutting emissions as soon as possible', but due to the

large table of negotiations this conference also could not put a reliable mark on the issue of climate change. Therefore, it is necessary that these broader issues are tackled on smaller multilateral groups like the ‘Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate’⁷ (MEF) and G20, and move forward in piecemeal fashion through parallel national efforts of both North and South countries. Because, climate change is an issue of global concern where an individual effort is no more efficient. Thus, there is a need of a ‘unified global order’ which could integrate countries against the global threat of climate change.

A stable global order is also required for ‘war against terrorism’. Terrorism was not a global threat before 9/11. But in the post 9/11 world, terrorism has become a biggest challenge in front of world. Globalization has also contributed to the growth of terrorism from a regional phenomenon to a global one. Though it is inaccurate to say that globalization is responsible for terrorism but technologies associated with globalization have been exploited by terrorists. In particular, ‘technologies driven by globalization’ have improved the ability of terrorist groups to work together, share information and reach out to the previous unavailable audiences. Hence the solution for this global problem is also global and it will only be achieved by a ‘collective war against terrorism’.

In nutshell the major global changes enforcing the ‘Re-imagining of Global Order’ in coming decades will be:

- (i) Sustained economic growth of China and India, which increases their geopolitical and geostrategical weight in ongoing global power game.
- (ii) The continuous rise of China and India, and the relative decline of superpower— United States in the international system.
- (iii) United States’ search for alliances to retain its supremacy and seek for strategic and peaceful relations with emerging powers— China and India to sustain the present global order.
- (iv) ‘Rise of Global South’, which is steadily transforming North-South divide into North-South linkage as it can be seen in ongoing transmutation of G-7 into G-20.
- (v) Shift in the centre of gravity of power from Trans-Atlantic to Indo-Pacific which is transforming the sea lanes of Indo-Pacific as ‘lanes of alliance and coalitions’ for incorporating countries of the world.
- (vi) Global concerns over the issues of transnational threats like climate change and terrorism which is integrating world together to stand and build a sustainable and peaceful global order.

⁷ Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate (MEF) is a group of 17 major economies (Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, South Korea, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States). The MEF is intended to facilitate a candid dialogue among major developed and developing economies, help generate the political leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome at the UN climate change conference in Copenhagen, and advance the exploration of concrete initiatives and joint ventures that increase the supply of clean energy while cutting greenhouse gas emissions.

(vii) And last but not the least, the increasing impact of forces of growth and globalization which is gradually globalizing the power through out the globe has changed the dynamics of power. Hence in coming decades, power will no longer reside with one or two key nations, but be spread across networks and coalitions of countries incorporating under a single umbrella of unified global order.

Therefore, all these enforcing transformations demand re-imagining of global order, whether it comes by accumulating new emerging powers to present global order or by recasting a substantial hierarchy of established and emerging powers in a new frame associated with the sharing concerns of global commons.

CONCLUSION

Global shift in the gravity of power and the continuous rise of China and India as new emerging powers have now made the debate of re-imagining global order more significant and viable. The great wave of power transition has also changed the dynamics of present global order which is a gigantic emblem of supremacy of United States since post-cold war era. Hence, a new complex game of being powerful, relevant and influential in new global order has been unfolded between the dominant and emergent powers. Each of them is struggling to make them centric in balance of power and trying to polarize the global system according to their own interests. United States seeks to sustain the present global order and tries to remain indeed, intensify and influential in global engagements, while China and India want to translate their newly acquired power into greater authority in the new global order to reshape the rules and institutions in accordance with their own interests. But, here it is important to know that global order is not just state centric. It's not only associated with these traditional concerns of balancing of power, polarizing the international system and establishing collective security, but also related with the impact of the forces of globalization, global concerns on climate change, collective war against terrorism and bridging the so called North-South division of the world. Without these contemporary concerns it's not possible to build a stable global order. Therefore, it would be vital for reimagining a global order that all

great powers come together, converge their interests and work collectively for the sharing concerns of global commons. This is the way from where we can reach near the vision of stable, secure, peaceful, prosperous and unified global order; and this is yet to be seen...

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