MOBILIZATION THROUGH POLITICAL VIOLENCE: A CASE STUDY OF VHP’s ROLE IN RAJASTHAN

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Abstract

The Sangh Parivar in India, has for long used the strategy of violence to mobilize people to attain their political and cultural objectives. Such strategy champions the cause of both communal tension as well as electoral victory. Through the course of this paper an attempt has been made to determine the evolution of the strategy of violence and its role in generating mobilization in the Hindu community.

The Hindu Mahasabha through its affiliation with the Sangh Parivar outfits has played a pivotal role in bringing about such a mobilization. The state of Rajasthan has been used as a case study in this paper. From statistical data, it appears that areas in which the Sangh Parivar have had a stronghold, have witnessed higher instances of communal tensions. The tactics of Trishul distribution and the shuddhi drive have been put into play. Such trends have not only affected the domestic politics of one particular state but that of the entire country. Therefore the question that remains to be answered is: What is the politics of violence? Are the state institutions of a democratic country like India falling prey to such trends of mobilization? And finally, has the politics of violence genuinely been able to play a pivotal role in the act of Hindu mobilization?

Keywords: Violence   Hindu nationalism   Communal Violence   Trishul Distribution

Mobilization

Violence as a strategy, to mobilize people culturally and politically, has been used by several political, religious and cultural organizations across the world. In India, particularly the Sangh Parivar with its various outfits namely: the Bajarang Dal, Vishva Hindu Parishad and Durga Vahini, have used this strategy to mobilize people to attain their political and cultural objectives.

Before delving into the historical evolution of the strategy, its cause and effect and the potential of its success, the focus of this paper would rest on description of the concept of violence. In this context, two central questions need to be addressed. What is the essence of the concept of violence? How has it played a pivotal role in the act of mobilization?

Violence is a strategic action that serves the purpose of championing communal tension and securing electoral victory or material gain. It widens the gap between the participating parties. Consequently it ensures permanent polarization, by breaking the link of communication between two communities.

When viewed in the historical context, the schemes of 'Divide and Rule', 'Morley-Minto Reforms' and the 'Montagu-Chemford Reforms', implemented by the British colonial government

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can be held responsible for the collapse of communal harmony in India. However these factors cannot be attributed to the construction of a religious and communal identity in India.

An eminent scholar Peter Van Der Veer argues that ‘community-based state policies’ had played a pivotal role in generating communal conflict in India during the pre-colonial period. He cited the example of Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (1618-1707 AD) who had imposed taxes on Hindus and destroyed their temples. The princely state of Jaipur is also an important case study. Here, the Hindu Maharaja Jai Singh II sought to create a society based on Hindu ideology.

In the post-independence period, formation of the communal identity was viewed with the same continuity. However, the source of this phenomenon was now viewed differently. The sustained existence of the idea of communal violence is now related to three ideologies namely, Hindu nationalism, Muslim Separatism and secularism.

Various schools of thought exist, to identify the cause and effect of the sustained presence of communal tensions in the Indian society. According to some intellectuals, the existence of communal tension as a product of the emergence of modern electoral politics, in which religion has been used as a tactic to mobilize people. Through such a stance, a dominant agency obtains a more powerful place in the democratic setup. Other scholars like Paul Brass, Steven I. Wilkinson, Nandini Sunder and Ashutosh Varshney have identified the contributory role of elites as a chief factor towards the propagation of communal violence in general and the mobilization of masses in the case of a Hindu-Muslim conflict in particular. The phenomenon of violence takes place in three phases: preparation, enactment and explanation.

To understand Sangh Parivar’s strategy of violence, it is necessary to understand the evolution of strategy of violence. Eminent academician Christopher Jaffrelot has referred to this strategy as “stigmatization and emulation of threatening others”.

**Mobilization on the basis of ‘Others’: Social Revivalism:**

The concept of Hindu mobilization gained coinage in the 19th century as an ideological response to European domination. This gave birth to the idea of ‘neo-Hinduism’. At this point of time, Hindu nationalism derived its strategy from socio-religious movements, such as Brahma Samaj and Arya Samaj.

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This was the phase when the Bengali intelligentsia (Bhadralok) were divided on their perspective about the British rule in India. Whereas one section of the intelligentsia defended the British for their remarkable scientific, technical, legal and social achievements; the other section perceived the West as a threat to their culture, tradition and identity. Thus, they sought to reform their traditions along modern lines but not to the extent of abandoning or renouncing them.8

Similar transition from reform to revivalism took place at organizational level with the emergence of Brahmo Samaj and the Arya Samaj in nineteenth century. Raja Ram Mohan Roy viewed British presence in India as a beneficial development and preferred Western reformist ideas, such as the abolition of sati. However, he was very critical of the proselytizing the work of Western missionaries.

Roy persistently justified Hinduism against Christian expansionism. He acknowledged certain activities of missionaries – stigmatization of polytheism, caste system and the condition of women in Hindu Indian society – and criticised them as latter accretions in Hinduism. In this context he mentioned, that the notion of a Vedic 'golden age' took shape when Hinduism was superior to Christianity.

While Raja Ram Mohan Roy focused only on the religious dimension of the Vedic 'golden age', Swami Dayananda Saraswati focused on the greatness of Indian culture and society. He depicted the Aryan society as endowed in vigorous egalitarian values. However, he did not ignore the caste system, rather he reinterpreted it. He argued that the social system was founded on merit based division of labour, rather than hereditary hierarchical relation. In this each Varna played a complementary role in maintaining the social system.9

In fact, Swami Dayananda’s concept of revivalism was a specific combination of stigmatization and an emulation of the threatening ‘Other’. He recommended some emulation of the ‘West’. This did not mean, that he desired to make India like the West. Rather, he wanted to make its standards acceptably Western. Conversion of Hindus into Christianity was observed as a challenge to Hinduism. Drawing inspiration from Christianity he promoted a purification procedure – the shuddhi – as a technique of reconversion.10

The Political Turn: Hindu Mahasabha

As a symbol of protest against the abolition of the position of Caliph in Turkey – religious head of Muslims – the Khilafat Movement broke out in India in the 1920s. The Muslims staged demonstrations against the British. Such mobilization provoked several local conflicts on socio economic issues as well. Alongside this new development, the issue of separate electorate and the special equation that the Indian Muslims shared with the colonial government came to the forefront. Hindus observed this turn of event as a threat to their identity in society. It was in this context that the Hindu Mahasabha revived in the 1920s.

The Mahasabha re-oriented the ideology of Hindu nationalism in the line of the logic followed by the socio-religious reform movements, in their early stages. The new logic was founded on the idea that Hindu nationalism had crystallized in order to reform Hindu customs and counter the threat of from West. However, in the case of the Khilafat movement, the ‘other’ referred neither to Christian missionaries nor the colonial government, but to the Muslims.

8 Ibid
9 Ibid
10 Ibid
In response to the pan-Islamic mobilization during the Khilafat movement Savarkar in his book *Hindutva: Who is a Hindu?* wrote about Hindu nationalism. This was the first book which discussed about the Hindu Rashtra. Even the term Hindutva was coined by Savarkar. However, he did not equate the term with Hinduism, rather he drew the definition of Hindu identity from Western theories of the nation. He put forth that the elements of: land, race, religion and language are considered, were the pillars of Hindu identity. According to Savarkar, the Muslim community was a threat to the Hindus as they could easily manoeuvre the latter, who were divided on the basis of caste and creed.

Savarkar did not offer a plan of action to the Hindus deal with this threat. Thereafter the Rashtriya Swayamsewak Sangh (RSS) was established by Keshav Baliram Hedgewar to accomplish this task. The main task before the RSS was to propagate Hindu ideology and infuse physical strength into the majority community. Consequently a network of *shakhas* (local branch) headed by *pracharaks* (preacher) were developed across the country. The foot soldiers of this movement were young Hindu men who gathered on daily basis to imbibe martial connotations and ideological training sessions. Soon the RSS became the most powerful constituent of the Hindu nationalist movement.

In 1940, Hedgewar was succeeded by M.S. Golwalkar. The organization was banned soon after independence on the ground of its alleged involvement in the murder of Mahatma Gandhi.\(^1\) This was followed, by the creation of the Bhartiya Jana Sangh (BJS) in 1951.

The BJS was established after negotiations between Golwalkar and Hindu Mahasabha chief Shayama Prasad Mukherjee. The task before this new organization was not only to penetrate into society through the *shakhas* but also through organizations working within specific social categories. Soon, the BJS became a frontrunner in the Hindu nationalist movement. Further, a student union named Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad (ABVP) was established in Delhi in order the mounting communist influence in the university campuses.

In 1955 the RSS founded a workers’ union, the Bharatiya Mazdoor Sangh, whose primary mission was to counter the ‘red unions’ under the garb of Hindu nationalist ideology. The objective was to promote social cohesion over class struggle. Thus, in this manner Hindutva received recognition in all sections of the Indian society.

To multiply its influence further, the RSS instituted target specific organizations. In 1952 the Vanavasi Kalyan Ashram (VKA), a tribal movement in Madhya Pradesh was established. The organization sought to counter the influence of Christian missionaries amongst the aboriginals of India such as the act of proselytization which have resulted in numerous conversions. The VKA imitated the method of the missionaries and successfully brought about a number of ‘reconversions’.

In 1964, the RSS in association with the Hindu clerics set up the Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP). This movement brought together the heads of various Hindu groups, in order to offer a centralised structure to this erstwhile unorganised religion. Alike the others, the VHP too considered Christians and Muslims as the “other”.

The Vidya Bharati (1977) and Sewa Bharati (1979) were other such subsidiaries which were founded by the coordinated efforts of the Sangh Parivar in rural areas. These sub-groups together have given the RSS a significant role in Indian politics.

Moving ahead, in the 1980s the Sangh Parivar adhered to the strategy of ‘ethno-religious mobilization’. Through this approach it sought to ensure victory in the forthcoming election. This was also the phase when the famous Shah Bano case came to the forefront. The Hindu fundamentalists compared the Muslim mobilization in the Shah Bano case to that of the Khilafat

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movement. Further, the incident of Ayodhya and the cases of conversion of the untouchables into Islam provoked the feeling of vulnerability in some Hindu dominated areas. Gradually such sentiments embellished a militant form. This lead to communal Hindu-Muslim riots across the country.\textsuperscript{12}

**Sense of Vulnerability and Continuity of Strategy by VHP**

The Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP) sought to curb the menace of conversion that was weakening Hinduism. Consequently, the RSS pushed the group to the forefront of its new electoral strategy that had taken shape as 1979. Thus, the VHP became the spearhead of the Hindu militancy in the beginning of the 1980s.

Muslim mobilization over the ‘Shah Bano Case’ was viewed by Hindu fundamentalists as renewal of Islamic militancy. At this point of time, an attempt was being made to reorganize Hindu nationalism against the ‘Other’, borrowing the latter’s methods. At the heart of this process was the VHP. Not only did it attract religious figures but also persuaded them to accept an integrated ecclesiastical structure, such that it could be at par with the organizational features of religions, that it desired to contest. Thus the Hindu fundamentalists adopted a two pronged approach, to counter the “other” and mobilize the masses in support of Hindu nationalist ideology.

Insecurity of the Hindu fundamentalists was amplified in early 1981, when a series of conversion cases to Islam, took place in South India. Many saw such conversations as a stance to escape the caste- ridden hierarchical structure of society which relegated them to its lower strata. Other observers attributed these conversions to the external funding received by the Muslims proselytizing organization. Hence from now on, the underlying theme of all public discussion among the militant Hindus was ‘Hindu society under siege’.\textsuperscript{13}

Thus the early 1980s was marked by the reiteration of threat – both real and perceived – from the minority communities. This feeling of vulnerability among the majority was discussed and communicated to the other Hindus through the identification of the distinct ‘other’- that is Sikh separatism, the influx of Bangladeshi immigrants into Assam, the visit of the Pope John Paul II and the government’s Pro-Muslim bias in the ‘Shah Bano Case’ and the Rushdie’s Affair.

At this juncture, the RSS adopted a dual track strategy, which combined the old and new elements. On one hand, was the ancient sentiment of vulnerability to alien communities that prompted them to reform Hinduism within the framework of the strategy of stigmatization and emulation. On the other hand, from the political perspective, efforts were made to bring about an instrumentalist mobilization, to develop the Hindus into a vote bank. Thus the political climate in the early 1980s compelled the RSS to return to the fold of militant Hinduism.\textsuperscript{14}

**Strategy of Violence: The Plausible Options**

Violence as a strategy of mobilization seeks to mobilize people for a higher cause and create parity in society. It is organized to generate an experience of participation and empowerment amongst its members. Moreover, the dichotomy of ‘us’ versus ‘others’ further integrates the different discontents among the category of ‘us’. Thus, such integration of various interests and


\textsuperscript{14} Ibid
different discontents under one banner creates a strong sense of solidarity towards being a member of particular community.

A violent-conflict subsumes various other conflicts under the umbrella of the friend-enemy (us-others) scheme and forges new social and political alliances. It addresses divergent interests, social and political issues and seeks to unite them under a single umbrella.

Violent conflict serves as a tool for elites who benefit from strengthening religious cleavages, materially or ideologically. They play a significant role in its enunciation, that is: preparation, enactment and explanation.15

In Hindu nationalism, this strategy is justified by creating contrast between ‘Hindu tolerance’ and ‘Muslim intolerance’, for the need of organized militant Hindu identity described as the ‘Semiticization’ or ‘Islamicization’.16 It uses culture as the means to create subjectivities. Thus in many cases, violence of Hindu Nationalism is state sponsored.

Thus, the pattern of anti-minority violence that accompanies the rise of Hindu nationalism reflects, that it follows a cultural rather than a political or economic logic.17 The geographic and demographic distribution of violence, determines the cultural beliefs of a nation and its adversaries. Media and academic discourses on Hindu nationalism generate the phenomenon of ‘cultural anesthesia’. This diffuses and deflects questions about the dominant agency and silences the experience of victims.

Interestingly, this new wave of anti-minority violence includes the facet of inclusion of tribals as well as the upward mobility of Dalits (Sanskritization). The study conducted by Subh Mathur puts forth that, the inclusion of Dalits and middle castes in the anti-minority violence is a way for them to claim a higher status within the Hindu hierarchical society. They dawn the role of protectors of the Hindu society against the ‘Muslim enemy’.

Over the years, the institutional power and cultural logic of Hindutva has got deeply entrenched in the daily life of every common man. Creation of the identity called ‘others’ has taken place through the prism of culture – where boundaries are created, and a distinct difference between ‘us’ and ‘others’ has been constructed. In an effort to give shape to this dichotomy the Sangh Parivar has given primacy to the cultural aspect of human life.18

As a political strategy, violence is effective as it appears either in the form of riots or as a counter insurgency operation carried out with tacit public consent. There is a definite connection between communalism and politicization however the precise nature of this connection remains ambiguous.19 Thus, violence is based on the construction and consolidation of group boundaries, and the development of the sentiment of antipathy between different groups. Consequently it reinforces the Hindu-Muslim divide in the Indian society.

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18 Ibid

Sangh Parivar’s Politics and Violence in Rajasthan:

Political and economic specificities of the region are very decisive in deciphering the nature of communalism. Region specific class forms and political rivalry between different groups also constitute the elements of communalism. In this section, an analysis would be made of the instances of communal riots in Rajasthan. However my endeavour is not to project the Sangh Parivar as the main agency behind the initiation and propagation of violence. Rather I seek to discuss the political and economic specificity of certain riots in general and the role of elites and state patronage in particular.

The role of agencies is determined by their successful rate in promoting the sentiment of antagonism against other groups. This may be related both, to their organizational strength as well as the social context in which they operate. With reference to cases of ethnic conflict in India, scholars view the agency of Sangh Parivar responsible for the initiation of the sentiment of antipathy towards minority groups like: the Muslims and the Christians.

The Sangh Parivar has a strong political clout in southern Rajasthan. Scholarly literature suggests that this agency has played a pivotal role in the ethnic cleansing riots in Alwar-Bharatpur (1947), Udaipur riot (1965, 1966), Jaipur riot (1989, 1990). Further, the victory of Sangh Parivar’s political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party, in the election of 1993 and 2003 manifests the effectiveness of its mobilized organizational set up in Rajasthan.

In order to substantiate the above mentioned point, a reference maybe to made to a PUCL Report, which highlights that during the phase 1995-2002, the state of Rajasthan was confronted by a total of 32 riots. Within this framework, the BJP ruled the state from 1995 to 1998 when four such riots had taken place.\footnote{Link: \url{http://www.pucl.org/Topics/Religion-communalism/2003/trishul-tables.html}, accessed on May 5, 2015}

**Instances of Communal Riots in Rajasthan (1995-2002)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Count</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995-1998</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td>2000</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2002</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total 1999-2002</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Away from history, when the princely states of Rajasthan maintained a record of communal harmony – despite their religious inclination – the present moment suggests that the administrators of Rajasthan seeks to break away from such isolation and blend with mainstream politics. Such a trend gained ground in the post Partition years. Data suggests that, during the first eight months of 1947 as many as 30,000 Muslims in the states of Alwar and Bharatpur were killed and up to 20,000 people were forcibly converted.

Quite interestingly, Varshney had once pointed out that communal violence is an urban phenomenon. The question that arises then is that: why are certain specific regions of the state of Rajasthan more prone to communal violence? Is it the element of historical and cultural specificity that act as a driving factor for such state of affairs?

A brief look into history, helps us understand that the previously existent princely states of India had traces of elements that suggest that political elites did play a contributive role in the activity of communal violence. The princes (the sons of soil) endorsed religious pursuits. They supposedly donated funds to temples and mosques as well as sought active participation in rituals. The patronization of Muharram by the government in Jaipur, is a case in point. Further, the ‘Darbari Culture’ made these states susceptible to communal trends. Such trends received a face in the 1940s when a fertile field for recruitment of followers by the Hindu Mahasbeta was commenced.21

In the years ahead, specifically since the 1960s, there was increasing presence of Christian missionaries in the tribal regions of India. At this point of time, the Sangh Parivar deemed it fit to make their presence felt in these regions to mobilize the tribals, to attain the goal of a Hindu Rashtra.

Consequently, the Vanvashi Kalyan Ashram (VKA) was deployed to carry out the agency's welfare projects in the region. The VHP too mobilised its resources to carry out its social welfare projects. Both the organizations heavily condemned the conversion program of Christian missionaries. Further, to counter such measures, both the VHP and the VKA initiated the ‘reconversion’ drive (Shudhi movement) in the tribal areas. The mainstay of this drive was to bring back those individuals into the Hindu-fold, who had converted to Christianity. However, this too became a manifestation of violence. The society represented a cleavage, whereby it was divided into the Hindus as ‘us’ against the Muslims and Christians as ‘others’.

Thus the approach of the Sangh Parivar’s strategy has been to polarise society on the lines Hindu-Muslim divide. Its objective lies in the creation of a homogenous society – above the class, caste and sect division. However the irony is that ‘Hindu societies’ in India are ridden by strong caste and sub-caste identities. This acts as an impediment to the construction of a homogenous Hindu Society. Such is the case of Rajasthan.

**Assertive Nationalism: The Act of ‘Trishul Distribution’ by the VHP**

After the successful introduction of the Hindutva ideology the Sangh Parivar embarked on the program of Trishul Distribution in Rajasthan. Such efforts did create an impasse in the domestic politics of the state.

As many as 6000 trishuls were distributed in the state of Rajasthan after the 2002 carnage in Gujarat. This was a drive to arm the people of Rajasthan on the eve of BJP’s victory in Gujarat.

A survey conducted by the People’s Union of Civil Liberties (PUCL) had brought certain fresh facts to light. It suggested that, previously the VHP intended to arm people in areas like Ajmer where the communities of Hindus, Muslims and Christians have had a strong and competing presence for the last seventy five years. Further, it selected areas where the RSS or Vanvasi Kalyan Parishad have had a base for years. In these areas the VHP distributed trishuls and armed groups of Hindus whenever riots took place. However, trends suggest that, this drive has since then moved westwards in the areas of Sikar, Nagaur and Bikaner where the influence of the Hindutva forces are weak. Till date trishul distribution has taken place in 13 districts of the state.

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It is important to understand that, developments in Rajasthan in the initial years of the twenty first century, were alarming in view of the Gujarat experience. Areas in Gujarat where trishuls were distributed in large numbers saw the worst killings. It could be said with much emphasis that the Viswa Hindu Parishad’s selection of time and place for trishul distribution in 2001 and 2002 definitely had a relationship with communal tensions in those areas.

The Nature of Hindutva Violence Relative to the Role of State Institutions

State patronage for any conflict makes the case for the dominant group stronger. Such groups use state institutions as a tool to pit the dominant values against pluralism. Conflict ridden societies in South Asia are a classic model to substantiate such an argument. State patronage takes place at various levels, from biasness of police toward minority groups to state funding of institutions, which are part of the institutional network of Hindutva politics.

Hindutva politics in Rajasthan enjoys such privileges. Major states such as Bikaner, Jodhpur and Jaipur have had strong linkages with the Hindu Mahasabha. It had projected Hindu princes as embodiments of Hindu pride and achievement. It viewed princely states as sites that reflected India’s past of purity and as foundation for the future. All major ‘Rajputana states’ had joined this movement.

Over the years it has been found that alike Gujarat, Rajasthan has been a state where the police have largely been incapable and unwilling to act against Hindu mobilisation. They have tacitly offered support to the rioters from the Sangh Parivar. There are evidences to this end, namely the curfew imposed by the police during the 1989 riot. Often the police portray Muslims and Hindus as equally responsible and equally affected by violence, and the action of Hindus are most often portrayed as retaliatory and defensive. A perception of pessimism has developed, regarding the state’s capability to contain such violence perpetrated by Sangh Parivar.

Thus, the failure of state institutions to curb such violence has led to a situation of trust deficit between citizens and the state. But the government has prevented large-scale riots. Neither has it promoted violence, nor has it passively allowed hard-line nationalists to carry out offensives. On various instances the government has banned the distribution of pamphlets containing objectionable content that could brew communal tensions and have in many other occasions filed cases against the publishers of such pamphlets.

One may decipher a slight difference between the communal violence in Rajasthan to that of other states. A prime cause to this end being the communalization imbibed in the minds of the youngsters through the medium of textbooks. Alongside indoctrinating the young minds, the tribals too have been used as instruments to develop the strategies of Hindutva.

Another deadly facet of the ideology of Hindutva is the usage of physical violence against Christians and other minority groups. The Hindutva fundamentalists have for long advocated the desire to wipe out religious minorities, particularly the Muslims and Christians from India. To this end reference may be made, to the severe persecution of Christians since the early part of the 1990s. The VHP leaders had made a public statement in 1997 that ‘they will make the district of Banaswara free of Christians by 2000 AD.’ It is said that within three years after this threat there were ‘at least 25 violent attacks against Christians’ in the state.

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Similarly politicisation of the act of conversion is another important facet of the movement. The ideology of Hindutva advocates a socio-political reading of conversion and so they link conversion 'with colonial power, ecclesiastical expansion, political manipulation' and 'social disturbance'.

**Conclusion**

The strategy of Sangh Parivar has been, to make inroads into the social structure of Rajasthan. Only structural developments and cautious actors can mend the prevalent intra-Hindu cleavages and construct a more homogenous identity. It is beyond doubt that a homogenous majority community would only increase the degree of Hindu-Muslim cleavage and vice-versa.

With reference to the state of Rajasthan, the Sangh Parivar has increased the intensity of conflict through staging an ideology that supports the use of violence as well as through techniques of preparation, enactment and explanation of communal violence.

Thus, instances of mobilization through political violence is witnessed in areas where the Sangh Parivar has a stronghold. Clearly, the biasness of the state institutions namely police, judiciary are rooted in an ideological conviction. However, is difficult to trace a single cause and consequence relationship. The strategy of violence only increases the scope of Hindu-Muslim divide in society and creates animosity between groups. This continues to increase the probability of mobilisation in the future.

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