INTERPERSONAL RELATION: QUITE A CHALLENGE IN SARTRE

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ABSTRACT: In this article I intend to explore that in the thought structure of Sartre can individuals relate to each other? Are human beings able to act together despite having an individual intention of planning? Can human beings harmoniously coordinate an action or amicably relate with each other?In absence of common intention can social rules act as a guide or authority? Could interrelatedness of individual and cordiality of interpersonal relation exist? I would explain that agents could probably intend, coordinate and act so as to cohere with those of fellowman. I am troubled by the worry of the status of the 'Other' as the 'Other' in Sartre holds a distinctive place. I would analyse.

KEYWORDS: Other, Death, Situation

MY FELLOWMAN

Sartre explicates that the fact of the Other's presence in the world reveals to me the fact, that I belong to a world whose meanings are revealed not only in the light of my own ends but also in the light of the Other. There exists objective meanings independent of me, there are instrumental complexes which are already meaningfule.g.,"Ralentir," "AllumezVosFeux," "E Brooks Rd 1 Mile", "Roundabout Ahead," "Monroe Ave," "No Stopping," "Channel 3 Dr," *etc.* (the examples are mine). **1.** These signs which are given by the Other, advise me to adopt a conduct, in fact,it is the Other who is the point of reference and the meaning of these signs refers to the Other, in the sense that the meaning is not conferred by me. It is a *situation.*   If I do not abide by these directions which are peremptory, I may experience the usual mishap. So, in *my situation*, the coefficient of adversity or mishap arises due to *me*. Thus in my world there are not only possible meanings coming from myself, but also meanings coming from Others, however it doesn't constitute a limit to my freedom.The for-itself exists as *fact*, implying that its existence is existence-in-the-world-in-the-presence-of-the-others. I appropriate the world through techniques and instrumental complexes which are not given by me.   Sartre enlightens that to be a Savoyard does not suggest to merely reside in the valleys of Savoy but to use the ski in winters according to the French method, that is, to *possess* or *have* the French technique and not that of Arlberg or of Norway. Hence the Swiss or Bavarian Alps, the Jura mountains, or the Telemark skiing method would offer the French skier instrumental complexes, and encumbrances which are solely French. I apprehend the world through certain techniques which are offered to me. I discover myself engaged in an already

meaningful world, the meaning of which has not been conferred by me. The spoken language, according to Sartre is understood in terms of the situation, that is, in relation to weather, time, place, or environment, or situation of the city. If Pierre says, "All is well," what he implies is the *situation* of the city or of the country. Meaning of a sentence is understood in terms of the *situation* of the for-itself or of the Other. The for-itselfarises in the world, which is a world for Other for-itselfs also. The for-itself finds itself before Other for-itself, indicating that the for-itself discovers itself amid the presence of *meanings* which come into the world through Others. The for-itself is in the world which is *already looked at*; which is embellished with meaning. The existence of Other seems to put a limit to my freedom. The upsurge of the other brings certain corresponding meanings which I am, without having chosen them. Sartre holds that for the other, I am a Jew or Aryan, professor or waiter *etc*., I cannot seize this meaning bestowed by the other. This meaning is outside of me, with little hope of being modified by me. Since the Other exists apart from me, there is also freedom of the Other apart from my freedom, which entails plausibly, that I exist in a new dimension: as a being-for-others. This being which I am is *given,* it exists without being existed. It is through my association with others that I apprehend this being-for-others and endure it. I realize, I am a person whose meaning is not decided by me. I am somebody whose purport and content is decided by the Other. The Other designates me or classifies me, which I have not chosen to be. I encounter this alienation of my being. I am something for the Other, which I have not chosen. Thus, there seems to be a limit to my freedom and the limit is that the other apprehends me as the *Other-as-Object.* I exist as an objective structure for the other, that is, the Other construes me as an object and my situation becomes an objective form without my assent. My being-for-itself (*l'être-pour-soi*) is made an object in being-for-others. By the very fact of the existence of others, I have an *outside* in my situation which can in no way be removed by me. So, it is not only my freedom which limits my freedom but the Other's existence as well, limits my freedom. The Otherapprehends freedom in the light of her own end whereas, I apprehend freedom in the light of my own end, so freedom is limited by freedom. I exist as an objective form in itself for the other. I exist as alienated implying that I exist only *for the Other*. This alienated existence is not possible without my recognition of the Other as transcendence, and this recognition is a free recognition of the Other's freedom. But furthermore, if it was not a *free* recognition, then the recognition itself would be inane. The cognition is identical with my free assumption of my being-for-others. By the free assumption of this being-alienated which I experience, I make the Other's transcendence exist for me and conversely, I make my own transcendence exist as transcendence-transcended. "I have at my disposal an infinity of ways of assuming my being-for-others, *Iam not able not assume it"* (Sartre 1992, 677). I cannot refrain to choose to be, what I am for the Other, because the meaning is bestowed upon me by the Other. I cannot prevent to be seen through the Other's eyes. I am *already looked at* by the Other as hypocritical or frank, cowardly or courageous.

Along with a few readers, SorenOvergaard is critical of Sartre's account of the relation with the Other. Overgaard writes "for Sartre mutual recognition is not in the cards" (Churchill and Reynolds 2014, 114).   Instead, Sartre suggests in *Being and Nothingness* that though I do not choose to be what I am for the Other, nevertheless, for the Other I can try to be what I am for myself through the free choice of my ends.   If the Other objectifies me, I can choose beyond the meaning of objectification of which I am not the source. To be sure, I am free to cognize the Other as The-Other-as-subject or The-Other-as-object, similarly, the other is free to apprehend me as The-Other-as-subject or The-Other-as-object. Sartre advocates that "The value of the Other's recognition of me depends on the value of my recognition of the Other" (Sartre 1992, 320).   In fact, according to the free possibilities which I and the other choose, both can choose to apprehend each other as subject and escape "hell". It is a choice, where both, the Other and myself can behold each-other-as-subject and mend the rupture in relation. But it is a challenging situation, and Sartremaintains that "in order to make myself recognized by the Other, I must risk my own life" (Sartre 1992, 320). This intersubjective relationcould lead to stronger relationship—a possible situation where subjectivity of both is preserved. **2.**

MY DEATH

  Death in Sartre's view, never gives meaning to life; rather it removes all meanings from life,it takes away my freedom to confer meaning on life. It is "the nihilation of all my possibilities, a nihilation*which itself is no longer   apart of my possibilities"* (Sartre 1992, 687).Once death occurs, the for-itself can no longer engage itself in its own future, it can no longer involve itself in its own future. "I can neither discover my death nor wait for it nor adopt an attitude toward it, for it is that which is revealed as undiscoverable,......whose meaning is forever entrusted to others and to ourselves" (Sartre 1992, 697-98). Sartre affirms that I make myself known through the free projects of my ends. I choose myself as human and not as immortal. According to Sartre, even if I were immortal I make myself finite by choosing one possibility to the exclusion of other, by accepting the first possibility and rejecting the second one. Even if the second opportunity is presented later, it will not be same because it is presented after the refused opportunity. Thus freedom entails assumption and creation of finitude and has nothing to do with immortality and death, in fact, finitude is an act of freedom.My projects are independent of my death. I am there among things which are simply there. It is *my situation*. **3**The relation of *bein*g between a for-itself and the in-itself which the for-itself surpasses is the *situation*. The situation is the for-itself illuminating the things in the light of the end chosen. The fact of my death does not limit my freedom but it is my freedom which arises for me the facticity of death. My situation is to be *being there* in the midst of things which are instrumental-complexes and adversity and to nihilate these things.**4** Furthermore, by surpassing these givens, I make the situation and I make myself. The for-itself is a *being-in-situation*, which implies that the for-itself is not only *being-there* but

also a *being-beyond*.   In fact, the situation is lived through by being-beyond. Human reality is a *being-in-situation* and the situation is the whole-for-itself. The for-itself is indeed the being which is always beyond its being-there and there is no situation according to Sartre "in which the for-itself would be *more free* than in others" (Sartre 1992, 702). There is no situation in which the for-itself is simply not free. The for-itself cannot exist without being free, and it ceases being free as and when it ceases to exist. Though the fact of my birth is not chosen by me, but inasmuch as I rejoice over it or lament over it, I assume my life to be happy or sad and in a certain sense, I *choose* to be born.   I am an upsurge of freedom at a particular time and inconceivable at another time. "It is therefore a waste of time to ask what I   should have been if this war had not broken out, for I have chosen myself as one of the possible meanings of the epoch which imperceptibly led to war....Thus *I am* this war....totally free, undistinguishable from the period for which I have chosen to be the meaning, as profoundly responsible for the war as if I had myself declared it." (Sartre 1992, 709-10).   Hence from Sartre's perspective I am responsible for the immediate aftermath of George Floyd demise because I have chosen myself the aftermath as one of the possible meanings of his demise, and a way of assimilating it in *my* situation. "We have the war we deserve" writes Sartre. (Sartre 1992, 709).   He further illumines, "being free which is my lot; that is, the fact that I can not put the responsibility for making-myself-be off onto anyone but myself even though I have not chosen to be and although I have been *born*" (Sartre 1992, 496). This is my *situation*. He argues that I encounter my facticity in the projective reconstruction of my for-itself in the light of my end. The for-itself is situation and the situation is freedom. In fact when Sartre proclaims, "the slave in chains is as free as his master" (Sartre 1992 703), he maintains that the slave is free to constitute the meaning of his servitude; the slave is free to choose death over life in bondage. The very meaning of slave appears to him in the light of the chosen end, that is he can either choose servitude and perpetually remain a slave or risk the worst in order to get rid of his slavery, his choice is genuinely free. The choice of the slave is an individual choice of an empirical situation, in its supreme uniqueness. The slave is a free choice. The action of the slave whether notable or petty reveals this choice and emanates from it. This is what Sartre calls freedom, hence, the slave's choice has a meaning—that is precisely Sartre's point. It's very probable that the slave may not be able to acquire the affluence and lavishness of his master, but these are not the goals of his project. The slave has to necessarily choose himself on the ground of slavery and give meaning to his constraint. The slave can illuminate his constraint by freedom and give to its meaning as constraint. If the slave chooses to revolt then slavery is apprehended as an obstacle with its co-efficient of adversity. Slavery takes on its meaning only *for the slave in situation* and in terms of the free choice of its end—to get rid of his servitude in the midst of the world. Furthermore, Sartre does point out that the life of the slave is a free life as he may rebel against his master and die in the course of his revolt. However, the *situation* of the slave cannot be compared with that of his master. Existence

cannot be deduced. Each for-itself realizes only one situation and the situation is unique to the person, that is, *in situation* in which I am, it is I who have to choose and decide, all alone.Thus,the for-itself *makes* itself in situation, and the situation is nothing but the for-itself illuminating things in terms of the choice of its fundamental project**.** To be sure, adversity comes to things through the for-itself, it is the for-itelf which illumines the facticity and the facticity is nothing but "being-in-the-midst-of-an-in-itself-of-indifference" (Sartre 1992, 652). Therefore meaning is conferred by the for-itself in the light of a goal. But there is a goal only for a for-itself which is separated from the world by nothing except by its freedom, and which assumes itself as abandoned in the midst of the world. Sartre declares that "Human-reality is free because it *is not enough......*Freedom is precisely the nothingness which is *made-to-be* at the heart of man which forces human-reality *to make itself* instead of *to be. .....*Without any help whatsoever, it is entirely abandoned to the intolerable necessity of making itself be—down to the slightest detail. Thus freedom is not *a* being; it is *the being* of man—*i.e.,* his nothingness of being" (Sartre 1992, 568-69). **5.** This abandonment is manifested as *situation* and the situation is that I am never free except in a situation.**6.** Sartre says that adversity, ensemble of constraints, unpredictability, and indifferent brute existents are vacuous within themselves, but in the light of the *chosen end*, they are bestowed with meaning by the for-itself and revealed in experience to the for-itself. If we hide from ourselves this consciousness of freedom, we are in bad faith, that is, we are considering ourselves as products without any beginning, which means we cannot *become*. Thomas C. Anderson observes, "No matter what its facticity or situation, freedom alwaysnihilates, denies, detaches itself from it by intending nonexisting ends" (Anderson 1993, 22). Anderson, seemingly considers Sartre's view on freedom to be ambiguous: freedom as conditionedand total. But Sartre's view is precisely that I am *in* a *situation,* where I am not free to be not-free and I am not free except *in situation*: the unpredictability and the powerful ensemble constraints of *environment.*

CONCLUSION

I have demonstrated that in the philosophy of Sartre I am *free to choose in situation*but I *cannot choose to be free in situation*. Existence is freedom and cannot be separated from choice, that is, from the person herself. I have argued that the for-itself is separated from its *essence* by nothingness. The in-itself is actuality. The for-itself is possibility: freedom. The situation of the for-itself is that it is *made to be* by what it chooses *to be* in the world, whatever this world may be. Choosing ourselves is our situation. We make ourselves in light of the end which we choose, and which does not yet exist but can be conceived only as a state to-come of the real existents which separate us from it. *My choice* is my *whole situation* and

I am my all kindsof *situations*. "I choose myselfperpetually and can never be merely by virtue of having-been-chosen; otherwise I should fall into the pure and simple existence of the in-itself (Sartre 1992, 617). The for-itself is the self which it will be, in the mode of not being it, it is consciousness of being its own future. The principal project is: what I choose to *do,make*, *become*, *or have*. All my other choices are associated with this continuous project to *do*, *make,become*, *or have* myself. With regard to what I choose to *do* with or in my situation, I *myself* have to decide. Situation and facticity can in no way limit the freedom of for-itself because strictly the limit is never encountered by the for-itself. Furthermore, the only limit which it may encounter is that which it *chooses* to impose upon itself in relation to its past, environment, fellowman and death. It is my freedom which makes me unable *to be* without choosing myself.

Footnotes:

1. For Sartre's example see *Being and Nothingness* p.655.

2. For a classic philosophical discussion and distilled insights on authenticity, See. SomogyVarga, 2011. *Authenticity as an Ethical Ideal*. New York: Routledge.

   3.See *Jean-Paul Sartre, Anarchist Philosophy,*William L. Remley. Remley argues that Sartre is plausibly maintaining a tentative notion of human nature, and an idea of a general human condition. It may however be objected, because according to Sartre I *make* myself, besides *situation* is always concretely experienced as *mine.*

   4.See *Nausea*. Antoine Roquentin, the narrator states: "The essential thing is contingency. I mean that, by definition, existence is not necessity. To exist is simply *to be there;* what exists appears, lets itself be *encountered*, but you can never *deduce* it" (Sartre 1965, 188).

   5.See. Sarah Richmond. 2014. "Nothingness and Negation" in *Jean-PaulSartre: Key Concepts*. Edited by Steven Churchill and Jack Reynolds. New York: Routledge.

6. Google Scholar. Mentuz, Dimitry 2018. "Ontology, Authenticity, Freedom, and Truth in Heidegger's and Sartre's Philosophy". *European Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences* 1:76-83.https://philpapers.org/archive/MENNAF.pdf

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