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## **INDIA'S ROLE IN UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING (A Study During 1960 to 1987)**

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### **ABSTRACT**

This article is deals with the analysis of India's role during 1960 to 1987. In this period India has participated in 6 operations. India's role could be well discussed from the activities in Indian forces' during various peace-keeping missions. India had sent its soldiers to met out the UN requirements and played a key role in many operations. This also highlights, why India actively engaged in UN peace-keeping missions? What were the goals India wanted to achieve for its foreign policy in general and for global peace in particular? What were its compulsions and interests for participation in such operations during Cold-War Era?

#### **Introduction**

This role of India could be well discussed from the activities of Indian forces' during various peace-keeping missions. An in-depth examination the Indian participation during different operations will highlight true nature of India's contribution to UN peace-keeping. In the absence of international political condition envisioned by the Charter, the peace-keeping responsibilities undertaken by the U.N. depended on the willingness and ability of such medium powers as India, whose interests in a particular conflict were identified with the world body. Because of its nonaligned credentials and non-involvement in military groupings India's reputation as a genuinely involved power to play the role of peace-keeping has been established. Its service for UN operations to maintain or bring about peace in troubled areas was frequently called upon.

This article is deals with the analysis of India’s role during 1960 to 1987. In this period India has participated in 6 operations. A clear picture of India’s participation during this period could be ascertained in Table-1, provides an overview of India’s involvement in these operations.

**Table – 1\***

**India’s Participation in the UN Peace-keeping Activities**

**(1960-1987)**

| Sr. No. | Country                      | Mission | Year     | Particulars                           |
|---------|------------------------------|---------|----------|---------------------------------------|
| 1.      | Congo                        | ONUC    | 1960-64  | The first multi-role PKO; 1200 troops |
| 2.      | West New Guinea (West Irian) | UNSF    | 1962-63  | Force Commander and Observers         |
| 3.      | Yemen                        | UNYOM   | 1963     | Force Commander and Observers         |
| 4.      | Cyprus                       | UNFICYP | 1964 --- | Three Force Commander and Observers   |
| 5.      | Dominican Republic           | DOMREP  | 1965     | Secretary Generals Military Adviser   |
| 6.      | Iraq-Iran                    | UNIIMOG | 1987     | Observers                             |

\* **Source** : R.S. Yadav, “India’s Role in UN Peace-keeping” *World Focus*, vol. 18 nos. 10-12, October-December, 1997, p. 24.



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**(i) Operation in Congo :**

Sudden independence of Congo on June 30, 1960 by the Belgium led to a new domestic tussle for power between different Congo's leaders. While Patrice Lumumba was an uncompromising anti-colonial leader, Moise Tshombe had pro-Belgian leanings. Both were ambitious. Soon after independence, the province of Katanga seceded from Congo, and Tshombe invited the Belgian troops to assist it to grant protection. Since Belgium was already concerned about the safety and interests of Belgians residing in Leopoldville, and had contemplated marching into the Capital to restore order and protect the lives of the Belgium citizens, they acceded to the request.<sup>1</sup>

The Belgian troops met with strong resistance from the Congolese soldiers. The Lumumba Government felt that the disorder was mainly caused by the foreign troops entering the capital and not by the rioting dissenters. Lumumba blamed Belgium for aggression and also of complicity with Tshombe to perpetuate its hold over Congo by encouraging secession.<sup>2</sup>

Thus, a civil war finally escalated in to a major international armed conflict between nationalism and colonialism. It is hard to determine the authenticity of the statements of Lumumba, and also to justify the entrance of Belgian troops in to Katanga, but the fact remains, that the indigenous leadership was primarily at fault for inviting foreign troops to restore order in a already independent state.<sup>3</sup>

The first appeal from the Congo Government related to internal disturbances and not to violation of international peace which is the only legal basis for UN action.

The UN and its member took serious view of the situation prevailing in Congo at that time. The Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold, sensing the danger inherent in the Congo situation, called an emergency meeting of the Security Council and requested authorization for sending a United Nation's military force to the Congo. The Security Council by a 8-0 vote called on Belgium to withdraw its troops, and also 'entrusted' the Secretary General with the task of organizing a United Nations operation in the Congo. <sup>4</sup>



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United Nations operation in Congo occupies a unique place in the history of the world organization. It was the biggest single effort ever organized, carried out by the United Nations. In mid July the Security Council adopted resolution in order to carry out the resolution, the Secretary General set up the United Nations operation in Congo—‘Operation des Nations Unies al Congo’ (ONUC). ONUC was, on the one hand, a civilian operation and on the other an international armed peace force.<sup>5</sup>

When the United Nations forces went in Congo, the initial mandate was to ensure withdrawal of Belgian forces, to assist the Government in maintaining law and order and provide technical assistance. The mandate was later on modified to maintain the territorial integrity and political independence of the state.

It was designed to prevent occurrence of civil war and securing the removal of all foreign forces, whether military, para-military and other advisory personnel not under the UN Command. Mercenaries were also to be flushed out from the territory.<sup>6</sup> For this purpose UN peace-keeping had maximum strength of 20,000 personnel and incurred the cost of 400 million dollars and suffered 234 fatalities.<sup>7</sup>

India was an active and warm supporter of the ONUC experiment and its commitment to the operation was political, military and financial. Indian delegation gave the strongest support to the idea of sending a UN force to the Congo in response to the appeal made by the Congolese Government. India made the largest single military contribution to the ONUC, when it seemed to stagger in the face of harty withdrawals of contingents by some African nations.

In term of money India paid 105,000 pounds to the Congo fund and unlike many other whose contributions fell for below the amount promised when it came to payment. India paid up fully the amount it had volunteered to contribute. But more then anything else, India regarded the ONUC as a new phase in the peace-keeping role of the United Nations.<sup>8</sup>

The Indian Government welcomed the formation of ONUC in the Congo. It is very much evidence from the observations of Nehru when he commented that –



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The United Nations responded with speed and efficiency. I think it is a good and desirable phase and it must marked in a new activity of the United Nations. I do not quite know what would happened in the Congo if the United Nations was not there.<sup>9</sup>

India's special representative Rajeshwar Dayal played a very important role in the ONUC, which operated in Congo (now Zaire) from July 15, 1960 to June 30, 1964. India helped the peace-keeping operation for more than four years in various capacities. It lent infantry troops, aircraft personnel, supply units, signal company, dispatch terms and postal unit.<sup>10</sup> In this operation Rajeshwar Dayal was the personal representative of the Secretary General Hammaskjold.<sup>11</sup>

Subsequently, at the behest of the UN, India enlarged its contingent to a brigade group. The formation selected 99 Infantry Brigade commended by Brigadier K.A.S. Raja. It consisted of 1 Dogra, 2 Jat, 3/1 Gorkha Rifles, a squadron of 63 Cavalry, 120 Heavy Mortar Battery, 13 Field Company, a company from 4 Mahar (Machine Gun) and 25 Field Ambulance.<sup>12</sup> A flight of six Canberra aircraft from Number 5 Squadron Indian Air Force (IAF) was also dispatched to Congo in support of the ONUC. It was commanded by Wing Commander A Scares.<sup>13</sup> By January, 1962 the ONUC had creditably obtained full control over Katanga at that time there was a turnover of Indian troops. The new infantry replacements were 4 Madras, 4 Rajputana Rifles (Outrams) and 2/5 Gorkha Rifles. In the 63 Cavalry and the Mahar Machine Gunners the parent units sent in fresh sub-units. The total strength of Indian troops in ONUC was 1200.<sup>14</sup> Headquarters Katanga Command was redesigned as Headquarters Katanga Area with Major General Dewan Prem Chand in Command.<sup>15</sup>

Rajeshwar Dayal who was the personal representavie of the Secretary-General has reported that by gradual pressure a situation has been created in the Congo in which the UN forces, have been put in a very difficult position. They have to watch humiliating spectacles without being able to do anything. A large number of African countries have been infuriated by the turn of events. They have started withdrawing their forces from the Congo.<sup>16</sup>

As a result of large scale withdrawal of troops, India had asked in 1961, to send combat troops, India promptly send them. They continued to stay in the Congo until 1964, despite India's own defence needs following the Chinese aggression. However, later India did disagree with some of the UN



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policies in the Congo. Nehru insisted that Indian troops could be sent provided the UN policy in the Congo was brought more in tune with the Indian view on the subject.<sup>17</sup>

From above discussion it could be discerned that Congo operation had been the largest and costliest of all the United Nations operations. India was one of those countries which closely participated in the Congo operation politically and materially. One aspect of this efforts to further a settlement of the Congo was its strong stand against colonialism and a deep interest to integrity of the country.

India's relation with African states are based on its historical ties and the pursuit of a common policy of non-alignment, promotion of International peace, anti-colonialism and anti-racialism.<sup>18</sup> In this perspective, India with great interest and with most friendly and sympathetic feelings welcomed the independence of the Congo. However, the tragic events which followed that independence saddened and were a matter of concern to the Government and people of India.

As India saw it, the root of all problem in the Congo was Belgian Colonialism. Prime Minister Nehru's view was that the striking failure of the Belgian Colonial system which left the Congo in such a state, was the result of long years of colonial rule which drained wealth from the country for the enrichment of the colonial power, while leaving the people of country utterly poor and backward.<sup>19</sup> But India also visualize that even the United Nations should not replace as a ruling authority or a foreign power in Congo. Its role was to help the Congolese to put their house in order. The Congolese people had to be left to decide their own destiny, as this was essentially a Congolese problem.

## **(ii) Observation Mission in Yemen**

On September 27, 1962, the Yamen became another problem for the United Nations. Civil war, with the chances of its having international repercussions, brokeout between Royalists and Republications in the Yamen.<sup>20</sup> After the death of King Ahmed, Imam, of Yamen, his son Bads, Imam, took over as king of Yamen. The young king wished to follow a policy of modern democratic reform, unlike his father, who was considered tyrannical and harsh. But just a week after the new King came to power, there was an army revolt which resulted in the formation of a rebel Government under Abdullah Sallal. The result was riots and violence.<sup>21</sup> On June 11, 1963, the Security Council adopted the resolution on the recommendation of the Secretary General in which the Security Council requested the "Secretary General to establish the observation operation as defined by him..."<sup>22</sup>



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The United Nations Yemen observation Mission (UNYOM) was established for its primary task of observing compliance with the disengagement agreement. The UNYOM, relatively small by the Suez and Congo peace-keeping standards and further hampered by delay in compliance by the parties involved, did, provide a presence of the United Nations. It served to restrict the scope of the belligerent activity.<sup>23</sup>

The total personnel required for the observation mission nearly 200. This figure would include a small numbers of officer-observer, a ground patrol unit, crews and ground crews for about eight small aircraft and personnel for supporting services as communications, logistics, medical aid, transportation and administration.<sup>24</sup>

The Indian Contribution was significant in this mission. India provided force commander and some observers to UNYOM in 1963. In August 1963 Major General Inderjit Rikhy, the Secretary General's Military Adviser, was sent to the Yemen to inspect the mission and assist it in solving its problems. Beside, Lt. General P.S. Gyani became the head of the mission for some time and Colonel S.S. Scharwal was appointed as the chief of staff of the mission in the absence of Pier. P. Spinelli for health reason.<sup>25</sup>

India had a special interest and concern in the crisis of Yemen particularly when the new Imam asserted that he would maintain a policy of positive neutrality and non-alignment. Obviously the Imam was obliged to follow this policy because of the interests of the big powers in the Arabian Peninsula. Clearly the Yemen's location in the Arabian Peninsula was of a strategic importance. Moreover its oil deposits were of considerable economic value to the UK and the USA, consequently, both of them wanted to ruled out the possibility of army communist penetration in this region.<sup>26</sup>

The crisis in Yemen, according to the Indian politicians, was a class struggle, Hence the conflict got the support of the states pursuing divergent ideological moorings. The UAR and Saudi Arabia respectively followed two different policies and had come to the help of two conflicting groups in the Yemen. So that solution should have been sought at a high level meeting between King Faisal and President Nassar. India offered its services in the hope of bringing about a peaceful settlement through negotiations.<sup>27</sup>





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India's concern in Yemen was with the intention to their protocol of the independence and sovereignty of the state. It means that there should be no foreign interference, rather a sincere spirit, of neighborliness should prevail. That is why, India highly appreciates and supports the nationalist movement in these areas. Arab nationalism according to India, is an important element in the research for peace and stability in the Middle-East.<sup>28</sup> India's political and military support was an essential element in United Nations peace-keeping operations in Middle-East, particularly in the case of UNEF. Its position in this operation was strictly based on United Nations provisions as well as on the general lines of its own foreign policy.

### **(iii) Peace-Keeping in Cyprus**

The Republic of Cyprus became an independent state on 16 August 1960, and a member of the United Nations a month latter. The Constitution of Republic which, had its roots in agreements reached between the heads of Government of Greece and Turkey.<sup>29</sup>

During December 1963, the ethnic composition of the population, their mutual suspicion, and politics in Greece and Turkey led to a conflict between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities.<sup>30</sup> In February, 1964 urgent action was requested by the representatives of the UK and of Cyprus. The Secretary General engaged in extensive talks with all the parties about the functions and organization of the United Nations force. After consultations regarding the functions of the representative, the Secretary General on 17 January 1964, appointed Lieutenant General P.S. Gyani, of India, as his personal representative and observer, to go to Cyprus, and stay until the end of February, Gyani's mandate was later extended until the end of March.<sup>31</sup> Later on 4 March the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 186 (1964), by which the Security Council took cognizance of the fact that the situation in Cyprus was likely to threaten international peace and security and recommended the creation of United Nations Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus [UNFICYP] with the consent of the Government of Cyprus.<sup>32</sup>

India did not see the possibility of an immediate solution to the Cyprus problem, and wished the United Nations to be provided with enough men and money to tackle its job successfully. India's participation of UNFICYP was significant. It supplied Commanders for the Force. Following the retirement of General Gyani in June 1964, General K.S. Thimayya was appointed commander, and





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remained in that post until his death in December 1966. Again in December 1969, another, Indian General Dewan Prem Chand was appointed Commander of UNFICYP and remained in that position up to December 1976.<sup>33</sup>

Besides, India sent an Indian Air Force Super constellation for Cyprus with 15,000 infantry and of medical supplies worth Rupees 2 lakh for the relief of Cypriot victims. Large number of Indians participating in the UNFICYP also served at headquarters at Nicosia. Thus headquarters had a ‘politico – military’ character, for there were military personnel as well as civilians.<sup>34</sup> General Gyani’s great ability and complete impartiality sought to make the force effective in the discharge of its mandate. He continued to bear the dual load of commanding the Force and conducting negotiations on a variety of essentially non-military matters. That is why Greek Minister was right when he stated that ‘for us’ Gyani means Honour.<sup>35</sup>

On June 20, 1964, General K.S. Thimayya was appointed Commander, replacing General Gyani. But unfortunately, General Thimayya died of a heart attack on 18 December 1965. The secretary General said on his death that, “General Thimayya, who was highly regarded for his military ability, wisdom, integrity above all his human qualities was a serious loss to the UN peace effects in Cyprus.<sup>36</sup> After that, UNFICYP was commanded by General Prem Chand. His military knowledge, sense of responsibility and his continuous effects towards a final solution in Cyprus were praised by many UN members.

India’s general attitude to the Cyprus issue was summed up the Cairo Non-aligned Nations conference in 1964; when India observed that:

Cyprus as an equal Member of the United Nations is entitled to and should enjoy unrestricted and unfettered sovereignty and independence, and allow its people to determine freely, and without any foreign intervention or interference, the political future of the country, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations.<sup>37</sup>



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So the solution to this dispute and the protection of the political independence and territorial integrity of the state should be achieved through renunciation of the use of force and the establishment of peaceful relation with all countries. During the non-aligned conferences and the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' meeting this same view of the Government of India were reiterated.

India has always strongly insisted that the country's sovereignty and independence is 'sacrosanct' and should not be handicapped by partition or union with Greece. Foreign intervention should also be reduced to an absolute minimum, for it would be more hindrance than a help in solving the problem. But India's interest in the Cyprus problem is whole hearted and sincere because its policy of non-alignment, which was shared by Cyprus, Indian was also desirous to play a balancing role in Cyprus in order to retain its friendship with Turkey as the latter's help was essential vis-à-vis its relation with Pakistan.

#### **(iv) Peace-Keeping in Dominican Republic.**

The three men civilian junta which had ruled the Dominican Republic since the overthrow in September 1963 of President Juan Bosch, the first freely elected President of the Republic for 38 years, was itself overthrown on April 25-26, 1965 by a military revolt headed by supporters of Senor Bosch. It was Immediately followed by civil war between Senor Bosch's supporters led by council Francisco caamano, and military unit headed by Brigadier Elias Wessiny Wession, an officer of extreme right-wing. With the collapse of all central authority, and heavy fighting in progress between the rival factions, strong forces of US marines and parachute troops were send to the Dominican Republic. Originally with the aim of evacuating American and other foreign nationals from Santo Domingo but later, to prevent the seizure of power by "Communist and Castroist" elements.<sup>38</sup>

The UN Security Council, which had been debating the Dominican situation since the beginning of May, unanimously adopted on 14 May, 1965, a resolution, co-sponsored by the Ivory Coast, Jordan and Malaysia, which called for (a) strict observance of the cease fire in Santo Domingo; (b) asked the UN Secretary General "to send a representative urgently to the Dominican Republic to report to the Security Council on the situation", and (c) called upon all interested parties in Dominican Republic "to co-operate with the Secretary General's representative in carrying out his mandate".<sup>39</sup>



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In view of the seriousness of the Domination situation, U. Thant had already sent an advance party to Santo Domingo on 14 May headed by his military adviser, Major General Inderjit Rikhy of the Indian Army. On 17 May 1965, in response to the Security Council's resolution, he announced the appointment of Dr. Jase Antonio Mayobre as his personal representative in the Dominican Republic.<sup>40</sup>

As military advisors Major-General Rikhy worked with the two other military advisers, one from Canada and the other from Ecuador. DOMREP was financed through the regular UN Budget.<sup>41</sup> India had involved UN operation in DOMREP because its foreign policy compelled it to do so. The whole internal atmosphere of India is to shower peace in DOMREP. India yearns for peace, not merely because it is good in itself, but because without peace there can be no improvement in the lives of the vast majority of the world's people. Besides, part of the Indian constitution bears a close similarity to the principles behind United Nations activities.

India's policy of non-alignment and peaceful co-existence, although designed to safeguard its own national interests at the time of cold war rivalry, later proved a real international policy. The fast growing membership of the non-aligned group and its various conferences and resolutions have made real contributions to the cause of peace in DOMREP.

#### **(v) Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group**

Border dispute between Iran and Iraq have a long history, and have been particularly acute with respect to the Shatt-al-Arab, the waterway that separates the two countries as it connects the Persian Gulf with the inland river system of the Tigris and Euphrates. The part of Barsa, on the shatt, provides Iraq's only direct access to the Persian Gulf and thence to the open ocean. On the opposite bank, the Iranian city of Abadan is a major petroleum refining center and shipping terminus.<sup>42</sup>

On 22 September 1980, Iraq launched air strikes against all Iranian air bases within range of the border and followed up with a full scale ground invasion.<sup>103</sup> The tanker escort operation in turn produced several sharp exchanges with Iranian forces. In April 1988, after the frigate Samuel Roberts struck a mine, US naval forces retaliated against Iranian offshore



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platforms, sank two Iranian patrol craft and a frigate, and damaged another.<sup>44</sup> On 3 July 1988, the US cruiser Vincennes misidentified an Iranian Airbus as hostile and shot it out of the sky, killing 290 passengers and crew. Despite the magnitude of this tragedy, Iran was unable to rouse sufficient support in the UN to condemn the US. The ground war was also going increasingly badly. The huge losses, and the recognition of its ultimate international isolation, led Iran finally to accept a cease fire.<sup>45</sup>

United Nation efforts to end the eight year war between Iran and Iraq [1980-88], led to the establishment of the United Nation Iran-Iraq Military observer Group [UNIIMOG]. It was established to verify, confirm and supervise the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of all forces to the internationally recognised boundaries.<sup>46</sup>

India played an important role in Iran-Iraq mission with the hope that the two countries will be able to end their eight year old war soon. This was conveyed during separate meetings between the then External Affairs Minister, P.V. Narsimha Rao and his Iraqi and Iranian counterparts, Tariq Aziz and Ali Akbar Velayati, respectively. Narasimha Rao also met UN Secretary General Perez-de-Cuellar, who was engaged in arranging a truce between Iran and Iraq.<sup>47</sup>

The UNIIMOG comprised of 307 military observers.<sup>48</sup> According to an announcement by the Indian Defence Ministry, Brigadier V.M. Patil was appointed as the Assistant Chief Military Observer (Iraq). Brigadier, Patil would lead a 15 member Indian Army contingent as part of the UN Military observer Group to police the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq.<sup>49</sup> The operations of the UNIIMOG were of a typical traditional peace-keeping in nature. The Indian officers performed their task in difficult areas with admirable dedication, professionalism and impartiality. The mission was closed in 1990.

US policy in the Persian Gulf operated on several levels. Washington sought to forestall Iranian hegemony, to support the Gulf Arabs, to limit Soviet influence and to maintain freedom of navigation and the free flow of petroleum.<sup>50</sup>



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The USSR initially welcomed the Iranian revolution and the collapse of US influence that accompanied it. The war further complicated Soviet foreign policy in the region, which aimed to maintain a friendly relationship with Iraq that entailed substantial arms sales revenues while cultivating relations with Iran's new Islamic Republic.<sup>51</sup>

India's policy of non-alignment to compelled it to participate in Iraq-Iran mission. Because in this operation both the blocs (US & USSR) were involved, so India was involved in this operation as a non-alignment country. There were many commercial interests of India in the Gulf region, especially the importance of oil supplies,<sup>52</sup> so it wanted a solution of this crisis. Beside, India's motto of world peace compelled her to involved in the Iran-Iraq observer Mission.

From the study of above operations, it can be concluded that during Cold War period India has played a significant role in United Nations Peace-keeping Operations. It always tried to strengthened the UN capability in the maintenance of international peace and security. In various crisis India tried to create international opinion, which led to peace in a particular area. Whenever it was required to sent the forces or medical team or any other material support for peace-keeping activities, India did it as per her capability.

The security and national interest and capability primarily bounds the guide lines of the foreign policy of a nation, and India was no exception to this inexorable law of diplomacy and international politics. So India found the United Nations useful in the achievement of her foreign policy goals such as the freeing of dependent people. The United Nations provided India ample opportunities for implementing her objective. The extent of Indian support for the UN depended upon the degree of usefulness of the United Nations for India. The satisfaction in bringing independence to dependent people by invoking the organization year after year depended India's dedication to the United Nations. India's independent and constructive approach to international problems and disputes considerably enhanced its status and prestige in international community.



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India's desire to take part in the maintenance of peace and security led her to contribute men and material resources to various peace-keeping operations during Cold War. Its desire to have a share in the maintenance of peace and security was expressed as early as 1946. The Indian delegation at the San Francisco conference insisted that "the small powers should be given an adequate role to play in any arrangement which concerned the peace and security of the world." <sup>53</sup> The Indian delegation believed that the small powers has a part to play in the maintenance of peace.

Indias compulsions and interests for participaton in peace-keeping operations during cold war period concluded in the following few points :

*Firstly*, India's reaction to international dispute had been to resolve the same by constitutional means. Following the principles of UN, it had always been against the use of armed forces and tried to preserve peace, through UN peace-keeping activities. *Secondly*, India's foreign policy stood for peace and friendship among nations tried to reach these goals as in the peace-keeping operations during cold war. *Thirdly*, India's permanent mission at the United Nations had a central role during the cold war period that its armed forces played a key role. It had always tried to guide the activities of UN peace-keeping in the best traditions. *Fourthly*, India had always been against the rule of apartheid and imperial powers. It had taken a stand like a rock in the ocean on the aforesaid issue and criticised them like anything. *Fifthly*, it registered its dissatisfaction over the provisions regarding the UN peace-keeping force and suggested from time to time, to revise the same in all aspects. *Sixthly*, it always wanted to weapon the organisation of UN with more and more power so that it could maintain law and order among nations more successfully. *Seventhly*, India's role in UN peace-keeping operations might be termed an 'objective' one. Mention could be made of Suez crisis to support this contention in which it did not care for its meterial gains and bad effects on its relations with Great Britain. Moreover, its prospective gains did not commensurate with the contributions it made in peace operations. Above all, Indian troops were allowed to remain under the UN service even when these were needed most to repulse the Chinese aggression on India. So it did not count its interests and prestige while standing for the cause of world peace. *Finaly*, the main air of India's

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participation in peace-keeping operations was to get all possible foreign aid for its internal economic development. The adoption of non-alignment also bore the same intention.

Thus, the objective of UN peace-keeping are common with the foreign policy goals enshrined by India during cold war period. India had the paramount sense for a peaceful settlement of international disputes and problems, the diplomacy and reconciliation that it used both inside and outside the organization. USA appreciated its stand to a great extent. It had been the follower of peace, policy of reconciliation, co-operation, non-alignment which could be termed as the main objective of the United Nations. Besides, they cherish the long tradition and outlook of India towards international relations. Hence, India was keenly associated with such activities of the UN since its inception during cold war era.

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