



SINO-PAK COLLUSION AS A THREAT TO INDIA'S SECURITY

Ajay Singh

Department of Defence and Strategic Studies, Research Scholar, Maharshi Dayanand University
Rohtak

DOI: 10.6084/m9.figshare.17704784

ajaysingh.rs.defence@mdurohtak.ac.in

ABSTRACT

Offering overt and covert assistance to a partnership in the face of a common danger is a dynamic approach used by a nation to pursue its own interests in the context of the current geopolitical environment. In 2010, Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jaibao made a special trip to India (just like Chou en Lai had done in 1961) in order to assess his adversaries and make a so-called "bid for diplomacy," according to the media. From Delhi, he travelled to Pakistan, where he praised the cliché that "China-Pakistan friendship is 'greater than the Himalayas and longer than the seas.'" Pakistan has now effectively ceded control of Gilgit to the People's Republic of China. According to reports, the POK is being phased out gradually (Pakistan Occupied Kashmir). As a result of China's new attitude to the western sector, it appears that India's dilemma may be far more widespread than the issue of stapled visas. In the same way that the United States focuses on Afghanistan and Pakistan, we must concentrate on 'China-Pak' as a united danger to India that might be controlled even more in the coming by Beijing.

KEYWORDS: Republic, Dilemma, Geopolitical, Assistance, Diplomacy.



I. INTRODUCTION

There are several complexities in the international relations of China, Pakistan, and India when comparing and contrasting the behavioural patterns of these country states with the various schools or concepts of international relations theory, as demonstrated in this paper. History, historic baggage of disparities, divergent opinions on many topics, and the prism of competition–collaboration all contribute to the difficulties of today's business environment. A complex interwoven drama is created by the relative national power of these nations and the participation of other parties, such as the United States (US), Russia, and even the recently active Quad. Sino-Pakistan collusion is a frequent threat scenario within this paradigm, in which one of the two countries launches an offensive against India that is followed by the other, or both launch an openly synchronised war on two fronts in the same region, such as Gilgit-Baltistan, in order to produce a coordinated impact. A cooperation of this nature, backed up by warmongers, or is it a feasible reality that might jeopardise Indian national interests and the country's national security paradigm? According to the Merriam-Webster Dictionary, a chimaera is an "imaginary creature composed of incongruous components," as well as a "illusion or fiction of the mind." Similarly, the term "collusion" is described as "a secret agreement or cooperation, typically with the aim of committing an unlawful or deceptive act." Even if both countries have their own aspirations and differing domestic agendas, collaboration between China and Pakistan would suggest a convergence of interests between the two countries. Are the two countries' collective interests on a collision course with India, or is there a middle ground where everyone can agree on what to do? If it turns into a two-front conflict, where will the battleground be decided: will it be the typical Punjabi plains or the glaciated and hostile terrain of Gilgit-Baltistan? An increase in the presence of People's Liberation Army (PLA) troops in Gilgit-Baltistan (according to recent newspaper reports), the recent announcement of funding for the long-delayed Diamer-Bhasha Dam, and the provisional provincial status accorded to Gilgit-Baltistan by Pakistan are all



indications of renewed interest in the region; and increased participation by China in trilateral groupings of Pakistan– Afghanistan–China, as well as engaging the Taliban, even if for its

The collaborative danger might present itself in one of three ways, depending on the situation. First, China and Pakistan may work together to execute a surprise coordinated strike against India from both its northern and western borders. Second, in the event of a conventional military battle between India and Pakistan, China may take use of the situation to its advantage. As an example, consider a situation where a substantial conventional battle between India and Pakistan threatens CPEC assets and Chinese people in Pakistan, providing China with justification for launching a second fight along the Line of Control (LAC) to divert attention away from India. Another possibility is the employment of Chinese naval might to divert and distract the Indian Navy's efforts to blockade Pakistani ports as part of its coercive strategy, which would be a variant on the previous one. Third, a confrontation between India and China might provide an opportunity for Pakistan to mobilise its military against India. The third of these possibilities is the most likely, given that China may be reluctant to be perceived as either opportunistic or overly confrontational in geopolitical terms. Furthermore, if China were to directly confront India, it would likely be able to do it militarily and without the support of Pakistan. A forceful response, however, might be required in the event of a danger to CPEC assets or for other geostrategic objectives such as communicating with neighbouring nations that are less developed. The most plausible scenario is a border conflict between India and China, which Pakistan may take advantage of in order to build a front across Kashmir in order to compensate for its comparative disadvantages with India. A military buildup by Pakistan, short of engaging in combat, might cause Indian forces to become stranded on that front. When the Ladakh border conflict between India and China erupted, Pakistan did not take this step, which was acknowledged by Indian military command. The Pakistani government, according to a leaked official memo written by the country's administration, has "continued to advise moderation in the China-India stalemate and has not taken advantage of the situation despite ongoing Chinese



pressure for the same." This helped to establish a favourable climate for the February 2021 cease-fire agreement between India and Pakistan along the Line of Control in Kashmir. It does, however, confirm the notion that a military conflict with China will almost certainly result in India being forced into a two-front war situation, with Pakistan being involved either of its own or as a result of Chinese coercion.

II. SINO-PAKISTANI RELATIONS FROM 1960 TO 1965

An unofficial series of conversations between China and Pakistan began around two years before the issue of a boundary delineation agreement between the two countries became the topic of formal negotiations. These negotiations appeared to have been launched by Beijing. All of these initiatives took place against the backdrop of worsening cooperation with India, which had been exacerbated by the marginalisation of Tibetan autonomy, Chinese territorial claims against India, the 1959 Kongka Pass Incident, and worsening Sino-Soviet relations as a result of Moscow's neutral stance on the Sino-Indian dispute, among other factors. With as many neighbouring countries as possible, China attempted to secure its borders by signing border demarcation agreements, agreements of friendship, and non-aggression pacts. Beijing began investigating the idea of holding similar discussions with Pakistan sometime in 1959, sending a map of the shared border region to Karachi to get a feel for the situation. The attempt to utilise discussions with Pakistan as a tool of pressure against India during impending negotiations in 1960, as well as to gauge the responses of the Cold War superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—were other factors in the decision to negotiate with Pakistan. Chinese officials viewed Soviet neutrality in the Sino-Indian conflict as a complicating element, prompting them to strive for the conclusion of a boundary deal with India as quickly as feasible. Even after beginning unofficial conversations with Pakistan, Beijing maintained to promise New Delhi that the topic of their common border was not the focus of discussions with Pakistan and that they were hesitant to engage in formal negotiations with Pakistan. It was only after the possibility of an agreement with India had been definitively ruled out in February 1962 that Beijing refused to negotiate with



New Delhi over the territory in Kashmir west of the Karakoram Pass that was under Pakistani control and agreed to begin formal negotiations with Pakistan. Essentially, this meant that Beijing was contesting India's sovereignty over the entire region of Kashmir. However, even at this point, Beijing had not totally abandoned the prospect of striking a deal with India, and as a result, its preparations for discussions with Pakistan were carried out in stages. Regardless of the ongoing discussions, the Chinese presence in Ladakh was regarded as confrontational in Karachi since Pakistan asserted sovereignty over the whole region of Kashmir at the time. As a result of the Chinese takeover, Pakistan closed its shared border with China and increased the number of military forces stationed in the region to counter the threat. It appeared on Chinese maps that the land, which had an extent of 6400 km² and was controlled by Pakistan, belonged to the country. The strategically significant Kilik and Shimshal Passes, which control the routes that connect the Chinese province of Xinjiang with Pakistan, were designated as Chinese territory by the Chinese government. Pakistani maps, on the other hand, indicated these passes to be located well to the south of the common boundary. When asked about the Chinese claim to Pakistani territory during a press conference on October 23, 1959, President Khan stated that the Chinese government had made no such claim, and that the only evidence of this was a map that had been received by Pakistan's foreign ministry, which depicted certain Pakistani areas as being part of China.

III. AN OVERVIEW: INDIA'S BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN AND CHINA

Indian ties with Pakistan have varied since independence, but have always stayed below the level of cordial relations. Although Pakistan has never forgotten its hostility for India, the country has pursued its quarrel by a variety of ways such as outright military action, backing insurgencies, fuelling ethnic tensions, infiltration, and the use of terrorism as a tool of state policy. The United States has employed international collaboration against India anytime and whenever it has the opportunity to gain a strategic edge over the country. The Pakistan Army, which is the driving



force behind the country's security and strategic objectives, has long sought "strategic parity" with India. China holds Aksai Chin (38,000 square kilometres), which is de facto a part of India's Jammu and Kashmir state but de facto a part of China (J & K). It continues to stake its claim to Arunachal Pradesh (92,000 Sq. Km). The Line of Actual Control (LAC), which was established during the 1962 India-China conflict, continues to be a source of contention and uncertainty. Since 1962, there have been two incidences of military fire fighting on the LAC; the first occurred in 1967 (Nathu La) and the second occurred in 1986. (Wangdung). China has recently made significant improvements in the military infrastructure and capacity in Tibet. Although several high-level agreements to maintain peace and tranquilly on the LAC have been reached as well as numerous rounds of agreements to work out a template to assist in resolving the border dispute by the Special Representatives, border altercations, where even a faint misjudgement can result in a limited border war, continue to occur on a regular basis. China, which received the Shaksgam Valley from Pakistan from the Gilgit-Baltistan region of J&K in 1963, treats India's J&K and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) on distinct concrete foundations, thereby appearing to challenge Indian sovereignty over J&K. China's treatment of India's J&K and Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (POK) China has also established a foothold in the remainder of the South Asian region. It has been expanding its economic and military footprints in India's immediate vicinity – Nepal, Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and the Maldives – as well as its marine interests and assets in the Indian Ocean, according to the Indian government.

The political, diplomatic, economic, and military conversations between India and China have continued despite the strategic concerns stated above, according to the Indian and Chinese governments. While India's trade imbalance continues to grow at an alarming rate, there have been frequent high-level state visits and a rapid improvement in trade (which is estimated to reach \$100 billion by 2015). The fact that all three countries are nuclear-weapons states is a significant aspect in the security interaction between China and Pakistan and India. In turn, this has an influence on the character of any potential confrontation. There have been allegations that



Pakistan is working on or has already completed the development of tactical nuclear weapons. According to the present Indian nuclear doctrine, our reaction to any sort of nuclear, chemical, or biological attack would be a tremendous counter-strike of equal or greater magnitude.

IV. THE COLLUSIVE THREAT

Historically, such a threat has not manifested itself, and it has not evolved thus far. In recent years, however, the emergence of a 'threat' has been anticipated as a result of the juxtaposition of infrastructure development in Tibet with the Chinese takeover of transit corridor projects and infrastructure, such as dams, in Pakistan's northern areas. In terms of possibilities, the danger might express itself in a way that is either Pakistani or Chinese in nature. As an alternative, it is possible that any state will take advantage of a negative scenario for India that has been created by the other state. Last but not least, there is a major strategic plan between the two of them. Out of this arise five possibilities: China sponsored the attack, Pakistan initiated it, Chinese forces act on Pakistan's soil, and finally an unplanned dual strike by the United States and China. Because China is capable of acting on its own, it does not require Pakistani cooperation. In fact, it may consider such coordination to be escalatory since it would leave India in a worse position, from which India would only wish to emerge victorious via force. Pakistan, on the other hand, may benefit from Chinese assistance. But China does not want to get physically involved into the conflict, even though it might offer logistical help to the region through the transportation corridors that are being built in the Gilgit-Baltistan region. The possibility of a dual danger in a China-led scenario exists in the event of Chinese plans to expand to the east. These might be grandiose in the sense of taking a specific region, such as Tawang, or the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh, or in the sense of 'teaching India a lesson.' The possibility of Pakistani diversionary manoeuvres in Siachen or Kargil in order to bind India in the western sector is a distinct possibility. It is possible that the 14 Corps located in Ladakh will be required to look both ways as a result of this. However, the practicalities of Chinese engagement and transit



across the Gilgit axis make this an unfeasible option because of the threat of Indian air interdiction.

The possibility of a Pakistani-led lawsuit is difficult to envision since China does not want the "tail to wag the dog." China may, however, join in such an adventure if it were to push India back and confine India's strategic space to South Asia as a result of its actions. Because dual-use formations, which may tip the balance in India's favour, would no longer be accessible, there would be greater symmetry between India and Pakistan. It is simpler to see Pakistan doing a 'hyena deed' than it is for China to do so since China is more likely to be able to position India at a military disadvantage than Pakistan. In such a scenario, with India militarily preoccupied with a conflict with China, Pakistan might attempt to win psychological ascendancy, eliminate vulnerabilities by military action, or restore proxy war circumstances. The final scenario of a coordinated twin strike is the one that is both the most menacing and the least likely. In such a scenario, India may direct its focus and weight against Pakistan first, while maintaining its position in the north. Pakistani engagement in such a venture is discouraged as a result of these measures. Because India would be heavily pressured upon, there is the risk of moving beyond the 'limited war' profile in this situation. In such a situation, India might validly retract its NFU in order to send a clear signal. This raises the stakes to a nuclear level.

V. SINO-PAK STRATEGIC COLLUSION SINCE 1965-75

Pakistan has continued to pursue war as a strategy of prolonging politics through a variety of tactics, whereas China has chosen the threat of war as an equally powerful foreign policy stance against India in recent years. ' In April and May 1965, Pakistani forces in the Rann of Kutch, already enraged by supplies of weaponry and ammunition sent by Beijing, launched a surprise attack against Indian soldiers in the area. The Pakistani rangers began trespassing into Indian Territory in the Rann of Kutch area in the early 1960s and took over the town of Kanjarkot, where they established a permanent garrison. Subsequently, on April 9, 1965, Pakistan launched



a full-scale military assault on the Rann of Kutch, including powerful artillery and tanks. Pakistan was victorious. Interestingly enough, this was the location where the boundary between the two countries was still up in the air. Chinese officials, without looking into the circumstances surrounding the armed confrontation between India and Pakistan over the Rann of Kutch, condemned India's action and made a fool of themselves by accusing India of carrying out US plans to "make Asians fight Asians" at a time when the Chinese broker, Bhutto, was toiling away in agony to bring the leaders of the United States and China together at a conference table. The crucial point to remember was that, despite Chinese backing for Pakistan, both superpowers were opposed to a conflict, thanks to the efforts of British Prime Minister Harold Wilson to convince them otherwise. On June 30, 1965, India and Pakistan struck an agreement to settle the conflict through peaceful means. Pakistan was bolstered by this agreement and started "Operation Gibraltar" to seize control of the Kashmir valley very shortly after. On the 5th of August, 1965, a large-scale incursion into Kashmir was witnessed from the Pakistan side. It was the intention of these infiltrators to incite Kashmiri Muslims against the Indian government and to carry out acts of sabotage in the region. The Indian reaction to this precarious condition of undeclared war was an invasion of west Pakistan, with the attack directed at Lahore, the province capital, which was located only fifteen miles from the border and was widely considered to be the heart of Pakistan by many. As is common on such occasions, numerous foreign countries voiced their displeasure with the violence and their wish for a cessation of hostilities. Some people sided with either India or Pakistan, while others were neutral. China received the most positive responses from Pakistani fans. She gave Pakistan her unequivocal backing and threatened India with dire repercussions if she did not do the same "for allegedly invading Chinese property along the border with Sikkim the Chinese government's policies stoked widespread fears of a global war in Asia. Because the Chinese linked the Sino-Indian and Indo-Pakistan hostilities, the world's powers became more concerned about ending the Indo-Pakistan war as a result. China was successful. Because of China's involvement, several of the world's big countries, particularly the Soviet Union, were unable to publicly support India and exert pressure on Pakistan. Despite the fact that President



Ayub Khan had called for the United States to intervene in the Indo-Pak conflict, the United States was not willing to do so. A spokesperson for the White House. Immediately, Bill Mayers ruled out any direct US participation, as advocated by Ayub Khan, and stated that the United States backed peace efforts carried out via the United Nations system. The United States, on the other hand, withdrew military assistance from both India and Pakistan in response. Because the United States refused to intervene, chances for Soviet diplomacy in South Asia arose. The Soviet Union was successful in its attempt to serve as a mediator. India and Pakistan were urged to resolve their differences via peaceful methods and through discussions, according to the statement. In a similar communication to Ayub Khan and Lai Bahadur Shastri, Soviet Premier Kosygin noted the following points: "Because of the current dire circumstances, the primary focus should not be placed... on stopping the tanks and silencing the guns. The Soviet Union also blocked Bhutto's effort to bring up the Kashmir problem in the UN Security Council, and insisted on a ceasefire instead.

VI. CONCLUSION

To summarise, similar geopolitical interests and geopolitical objectives will remain to be the most crucial element in consolidating Sino-Pak security and defence cooperation in the foreseeable future. The trajectory of Indo-US strategic relationships, as well as the negative spiralling of US-Pak relations, will also have an impact on the security dynamics between China and Pakistan. The strategic significance of Pakistan to China in purpose of securing access to the vast emerging resources in West Asia and Central Asia; the importance of Pakistan in terms of containing India's power and influence; and Pakistan's usefulness to China in terms of countering US global dominance in the context of shifting strategic alignments in South Asia and South-west Asia are the three broad areas in which China would support Pakistan from a long-term strategic perspective. Because it has an influence on the promotion of Pakistan's essential national interest vis-à-vis India, friendship with China will continue to be the cornerstone of its foreign policy for the foreseeable future. China is currently Pakistan's major benefactor in the



economic, strategic, and geopolitical arenas, and its assistance has significantly increased the country's regional strategic capabilities. As long as the India-Pakistan peace process remains anchored in the issues of terrorism and Kashmir, Pakistan's relations with the United States remain on a downward trajectory, and Sino-Indian relations continue to stay a mix of cooperation and competition, Pakistan will proceed to regard China as its most important strategic ally. Pakistan would require Chinese assistance in countering India's regional domination and, to a lesser extent, the expanding importance of the United States in the regions has sent. The United States has a significant presence in the South, Central, and Western Asian regions.

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